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INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court handed down two rulings
exploring whether group identity can be taken into account in college and
university admissions policies. In the first ruling, Grutter v. Bollinger, a
narrow five to four majority held that the University of Michigan Law
School had "a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body"2 and
found that the policy at issue was narrowly tailored and, therefore,
constitutional. 3 In the second ruling, Gratz v. Bollinger,4 by a somewhat
larger margin of six to three, the Court acknowledged that the Grutter
principle controlled. 5 However, the Court held that a different admissions
system employed by the University's College of Literature, Science, and
the Arts was not narrowly tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. 6
The decisions were both celebrated and condemned. Michigan's
President, Mary Sue Coleman, declared that the Court had handed the
University and "all of higher education" a "tremendous victory," a ruling
"in support of affirmative action [that] will go down in history as among
the great landmark decisions of the Supreme Court." 7 The New York Times
agreed, stating that the Court had taken "a historic stand for equality of
opportunity." 8 Affirmative action's opponents felt differently. Terry Pell,
President of the Center for Individual Rights, the organization that brought
the suits, characterized the results as "mixed decision[s]" marking "the
beginning of the end of race preferences," maintaining that their
"complexity ... make it risky for most schools to rely [on] these means." 9

The Washington Times mourned "a large step backward from the goal of a
colorblind society,"'" and the Wall Street Journalobserved that "[a]nyone

1.
2.
3.
4.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 333-43.
539 U.S. 244 (2003).

5. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 ("For the reasons set forth today in Grutter ... the

Court has rejected" the argument that diversity is not a compelling interest).

6. See id. at 270 ("We find that the University's policy ... is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that [the University claims]
justifies [its] program.").
7. Press Release, University of Michigan, U.S. Supreme Court rules on
Cases
(June
23,
2003),
available at
University
of
Michigan
http://umich.edu/news/index.html?Releases/2003/JunO3/supremecourt2.
8. Editorial, A Win for Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A30
[hereinafter N.Y. TIMES Editorial].
9. Press Release, The Center for Individual Rights, Supreme Court's mixed
decision on race preferences (June 23, 2003), available at http://www.cirusa.org/releases/63.htnl [hereinafter CIR Press Release].
10.

Editorial, Bad Law on Preferences,WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A16.
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looking for legal, much less moral, clarity... was surely disappointed." 1
Six years later the meaning of these decisions and the requirements they
impose on institutions wishing to pursue racial diversity are still at issue. "
In August, 2008, for example, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in the
United States Department of Education issued a "Dear Colleague" letter in
response to what it characterized as "numerous inquiries from
postsecondary institutions, individuals and private organizations, about the
impact" of the two decisions.13 Stressing the "highly suspect nature" of
"racial classifications," the letter described the "parameters" within which
OCR would assess affirmative admissions policies. 4 Roger Clegg,
President and General Counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity,
characterized the statement as a "belated" but "helpful and legally sound
description of what the Supreme Court held [in the Gratz and Grutter
decisions]." 15 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People ("NAACP") Legal Defense Fund, on the other hand, condemned the
letter as an attempt on the part of OCR "to further its efforts to subvert and
pursuing a
give unnecessary pause to higher education institutions that are
16
racially diverse student population in a constitutional manner."
None of this is unexpected. Affirmative action has always been and
likely will always remain a highly divisive issue, especially when examined
under the arguably artificial light cast by litigation and political discourse.
Professor Jack Greenberg was an Assistant Counsel for the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and litigated many of the most important
civil rights cases decided between 1949 and 1984. He has noted that
"[o]pposing sides in the war over affirmative action in higher education
nest of arguments over facts, philosophy, and
have generated a rat's
17
law."
constitutional
11. Editorial, Supreme Court Quotas, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2003, at A16
[hereinafter WALL ST. J. Editorial].
12. Grutter and Gratz both focused expressly and exclusively on racial diversity.
That was not surprising, since the Court itself framed the question presented in those
terms. See infra text accompanying note 140. Diversity properly understood is,
however, about much more than that. See infra text accompanying note 42.
13. Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (Aug.
at
available
2008),
28,
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/raceadmissionpse.html.
14. Id.
15. Scott Jaschik, Guidance or Spin on Affirmative Action?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.,
Sept. 19, 2008, available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/19/ocr.
16. Statement of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on Diversity in Higher
at
available
2008),
(Sept.
19,
Education
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article = 1323.
17. Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM.
L. REv. 1610, 1610 (2003). For a sampling of the literally hundreds of articles, pro and
con, see the following symposia: Post-Grutter: What Does Diversity Mean in Legal
Education and Beyond?, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 569-732 (2008); Meeting the Challenge of

4
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Even the most cursory examination of the literature bears this out. For
example, in the wake of the first higher education affirmative action case to
reach the Court, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' 8
Professor Derrick Bell described the sorts of programs countenanced by
that decision as "modest mechanism[s] for increasing the number of
minority professionals, adopted as much to further the self-interest of the
white majority as to aid the designated beneficiaries."' 9 Then-Professor
Richard Posner disagreed, characterizing group preference admissions
policies as an "administrative convenience" and "a source of both
economic injury and profound personal resentment to members of the
excluded racial or ethnic groups . "..."20Similar disputes arose after
Grutter and Gratz were decided. A "Joint Statement" signed by some of
the nation's most prominent constitutional law scholars argued that the
decisions "have affirmed the underlying values of diversity in higher
education and of racial integration in American society [and] provide clear
guidelines for institutions to use in designing inclusive admissions
policies."'" But Professors Larry Alexander and Maimon Schwarzschild
characterized them as "dubious as constitutional law" and argued that there
is "overwhelming reason" to the effect that "preferential affirmative action
is [not] a good thing."22
What is surprising is the extent to which even those who favor
affirmative action argue between and among themselves about the meaning
of Grutter and Gratz and what those decisions require. For example,
having carried the day before the Court, many of affirmative action's
champions now question both the propriety of the diversity rationale and
the costs that the pursuit of diversity impose. Professor Bell, for example,
argues that "the concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring
Grutter-Affirmative Action in Twenty-Five Years, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1-345 (2006);
From Brown to Bakke to Grutter: Constitutionalizingand Defending Racial Equality,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 1-250 (2004); From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action and
Higher Education in the South, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1765-2278 (2004); On Grutter and
Gratz: Examining Diversity in Education, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1589-1639 (2003);
Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 833-1229 (1997);
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1-255 (1979).
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of
RacialRemedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 17 (1979).
20. Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affirmative Action,"
67 CAL. L. REV. 171, 177 (1979).
21. A JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, REAFFIRMING
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION CASES 26 (July 2003) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT]. The statement was
DIVERSITY:

signed by Professors Erwin Chemerinsky, Drew Days III, Richard Fallon, Pamela S.
Karlan, Kenneth L. Karst, Frank Michelman, Eric Schnapper, Laurence H. Tribe, and
Mark Tushnet.
22. Larry Alexander and Maimon Schwarzschild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial
PreferencesandHigher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 3 (2004).
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affirmative action in the admissions policies of colleges and graduate
schools, is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial
justice."23 Professor D. Marvin Jones in turn maintains that "Grutter is a
very conservative framework at war with the project of affirmative action"
and that it "is not a victory, but a defeat in disguise."24 More tellingly,
even those who agree with the holding in Grutter dispute the extent to
which institutions adopting affirmative admissions policies need to pursue
anything more than structural diversity, that is, simply identifying and
matriculating a diverse class. Professor Dorothy A. Brown argues that
"[s]tructural diversity without more.., will not" achieve the goals
embraced by the Court in Grutter because it "will not influence student
outcomes." 25 Dean Evan Caminker of the Michigan Law School disagrees,
maintaining that "neither the majority nor concurring opinions ever
suggested.., that any post-admission programming efforts were a
precondition for the validity of admissions-related diversity efforts."26
My focus in this article is on key aspects of these debates. One common
post-Gruttertheme is that the decision simply provided the "fifth vote,"27
that is, that it gave binding constitutional force to Justice Powell's
acceptance of diversity as a compelling educational interest in Bakke. I
disagree. Rather, I argue that by clearly embracing the arguments that
Michigan made at trial and on appeal, Grutter went further than Justice
Powell did in Bakke and imposes stringent requirements on institutions
using race as a factor in admissions decisions.
Michigan's litigation strategy was intentional and well-crafted. The
president of the University when the litigation began, Lee C. Bollinger,
understood that "Justice Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke...
specifically precluded any justification of using race and ethnicity as
factors in admissions as a 'remedy' for past societal discrimination."28
23. Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622

(2003).

24. D. Marvin Jones, Plessy's Ghost: Grutter, Seattle, and the Quiet Reversal of
Brown, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 585 (2008).
25. Dorothy A. Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously: Getting Beyond the Numbers, 43
Hous. L. REV. 1, 17 (2006).
26. Evan Caminker, Post-Admissions EducationalProgrammingin a Post-Grutter
World: A Response to Professor Brown, 43 HOus. L. REV. 37, 40 (2006).
27. See, e.g., WALL ST. J. Editorial, supra note 11, at A16 (O'Connor's opinion
"has given [the Powell] view the fifth vote it needed to become the law of the land");
N.Y. TIMES Editorial, supra note 8, at A30 ("the court reaffirmed Bakke and proceeded
to use it as a template").
28. Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1589, 1590 (2003). The University studiously avoided embracing the only
other constitutionally acceptable justification for employing race-based admissions
criteria, the "compelling interest of remedying the effects of [its own] past intentional
discrimination." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720 (2007). As a number of civil rights advocates recognized, resorting to that
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Michigan decided accordingly to argue that what was characterized simply
as a "belief' in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was demonstrable fact:
that the "atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so
essential to the quality of higher education-is ... promoted by a diverse
student body."2 9 In particular, Michigan and its amici developed and relied
on "extensive evidence" that "a racially diverse student body" results in
specific, tangible outcomes.3 °
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter emphasized and
embraced the key element in Michigan's litigation strategy: its contention
that the educational benefits are "substantial" and that they "are not
theoretical but real ... ."" This is powerful language by the Court,
phrasing that strongly suggests that it actually expects these outcomes to
result from a racially diverse educational environment.
The good news for higher education is that Justice O'Connor and her
colleagues were persuaded that the pursuit of diversity is constitutional.
The potentially bad news is that there is every reason to believe that
institutions that employ race conscious admissions policies will be held to
the standards for which they argued. Namely, that they will need to show
that positive educational outcomes are occurring due to the resulting
matriculation of a diverse student population. I believe that this is the
logical consequence of what narrow tailoring means in a post-Grutter
world,32 one within which institutions must be ever mindful that a general
rule that race might be considered in admissions decisions does not insulate
particular programs from legal challenges.
approach "would not only be embarrassing for the university; it also might open the
school to lawsuits by black and Latino students who faced discrimination." GREG
STOHR, A BLACK AND

WHITE CASE:

How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

SURVIVED

ITS

GREATEST LEGAL CHALLENGE 83 (2004) (noting the concerns of Theodore M. Shaw,
the Director-Counsel and President of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund at the time, in a chapter discussing the "Arguments Michigan Wouldn't Make").
Two groups were eventually allowed to intervene in the case to press those claims. The
District Court refused their request; see Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich.
1998), but the Court of Appeals reversed, "find[ing] persuasive their argument that the
University is unlikely to present evidence of past discrimination by the University itself
or of the disparate impact of some current admissions criteria .......
Grutter v.
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
30. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 21-26, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241). A number of the amicus briefs were devoted almost exclusively
to the social science evidence.
See, e.g., Brief for the American Sociological
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief for the American Educational Research
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
32. See infra text accompanying note 181.
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This is clearly not bad in an absolute sense, since institutions that
voluntarily embrace race-sensitive admissions policies presumably do so
for the right reasons. That is, they do so because of the educational benefits
associated with diversity, spelled out in light of the institution's particular
mission. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. The need to do so
nevertheless reflects both the opportunities and the challenges higher
education now faces, given the reality of what the Court actually did in
Grutter. My point in this article is not that the current legitimacy of
diversity as a compelling interest is in doubt, or that institutions will be
required to repeatedly defend and prove that point. It is rather that the
reality of the actual results that follow from diversity plays a very
important role in defending the constitutionality of individual diversity
policies.33
It is in this respect that I argue in this article that Grutter is in effect
Bakke with teeth: a holding that allows colleges and universities to use
race-based affirmative action in pursuit of diversity, but also imposes new
obligations on the institutions that do so. The Court accepted the
contention that diversity is a compelling educational interest. But it did so
in a context that made it quite clear that a major consideration was the
expectation that the positive educational outcomes associated with diversity
actually occur, and not on the intuitive belief that such outcomes were
simply possibilities that might follow from the matriculation of a diverse
entering class.
My argument in this article proceeds in four steps. In Part I, I briefly
outline the origins and development of what is now known as the diversity
rationale. In particular, I note the seeds of that argument in Sweatt v.
34 its nominal adoption by Justice Powell in Regents of the
Painter,
University of California v. Bakke,35 and its refinement and formal
acceptance by the Court in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter.
In Part IL, I argue that the Grutter Court's embrace of diversity is far
more rigorous than many scholars have to date contended. Specifically, I
maintain that Grutter is in effect "Bakke with teeth" because the paradigm
adopted by the Court stresses that diversity constitutes a compelling
interest precisely because the educational benefits flowing from a racially
diverse environment are "not theoretical but real."3 6 Moreover, far from
deferring to institutions concerning their admissions policies, the Court
simply acknowledged their right to adopt their own institutional missions.
That is, each institution has the right to adopt a mission that embraces
diversity as an integral element of the educational objectives that it wishes
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra text accompanying notes 361-365.
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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to pursue. But the proper use of otherwise constitutionally suspect
admissions criteria-in this instance race or ethnicity-will succeed when
challenged only if an institution can show two things; that the use of such
criteria follow from and reflect its mission, and that the benefits associated
with diversifying its student body are actually occurring.
In Part III, I discuss specific consequences that follow from these
realities, using the situation that law schools now find themselves in to
illustrate both the obligations and opportunities that arise as a result of
Grutter. That focus reflects more than the simple fact that the dispute in
Grutter was about the consideration of race in the admissions decisions at
the University of Michigan Law School. Legal education is, I believe, an
especially apt vehicle for examining the realities that follow in the wake of
Grutter and Gratz. Law schools are, by their very nature, selective
institutions within which the need to use constitutionally questionable
criteria in the admissions process is especially pronounced.37 Moreover, in
direct response to Grutter, the accrediting agency for law schools, the
American Bar Association, made the pursuit of diversity a mandate rather
than a choice,38 a development that is important in and of itself and that
assumes even greater significance given that the ABA is now also in the
process of moving from an "input" to an "outcomes" model for law school
accreditation. 39
In Part Ill-B, I highlight the importance of certain key social science
evidence that bears on these matters. In particular, I note that the clear
consensus within the expert community that structural, or numeric,
diversity is necessary, but not sufficient, to produce the educational, social
and democracy outcomes noted in Grutter. My central premise is then that
Grutter and Gratz require more of institutions that choose to use race as a
factor in their admissions decisions than the structural diversity that, for
example, Dean Caminker characterized as sufficient to meet the rigors of
strict scrutiny. 40 In Part Ill-C, I discuss the need for and importance of a
commitment to continuous and rigorous assessment of institutional
37.

See infra text accompanying notes 236-244.

38.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

2008-09

STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW

Standard 212(a) (stating
that all law schools "shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to providing
full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by members of
underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and a commitment to
having a student body that is diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity."),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standards.html (emphasis added).
I discuss the details and implications of this infra at text accompanying notes 258-270.
39. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 1 (July 27,
2008) ("T[his] report recommends that the Section re-examine the current ABA
Accreditation Standards and reframe them, as needed, to reduce their reliance on input
measures and instead adopt a greater and more overt reliance on outcome measures.").
40. See infra text accompanying notes 272-336.
SCHOOLS, CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION,
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diversity efforts.
Grutter and Gratz provide higher education institutions with both an
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to remove at least some of
the ties that bind public opinion about affirmative action programs.
Institutions that fashion creative, proactive programs will be in a position to
show that the benefits that can result from a diverse educational
environment are in fact occurring. Public support for race-conscious
admissions programs in higher education is lacking.4" Institutions of
higher education, and law schools in particular, that begin serious and
transparent outcomes assessment programs will free the public, and the
students at these institutions, to fully embrace the laudable goals of
diversity. The challenge is to recognize the need for such actions and to
undertake them for both the right reasons and in the right way.
A second challenge is to find the will to eventually shift perspectives and
realize that true diversity involves much more than the color of one's skin.
My focus in this Article is on racial diversity and the requirements the
Court has now imposed on institutions that pursue that goal. That emphasis
is both necessary and unfortunate. It is necessary because current
discussions of diversity inevitably hone in on two and only two
characteristics: race and/or ethnicity. Properly understood, however,
diversity is about much more. It involves the full range of characteristics
and perspectives associated with personal identity. These traits include, but
reach far beyond, the color of one's skin. They involve a wide range of
beliefs, assumptions, and quite possibly prejudices: the individual views
and values that make each of us distinct. Programs and policies that reduce
us to a single denominator are accordingly unfortunate. I am confident that
the higher education establishment would argue in response that true
diversity is what they seek. The reality is that most policies and procedures
inevitably focus on a single consideration, race, and that the litigation,
political movements,4 and accreditation standards that follow in their wake
track this emphasis.
I. THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE: FROM INTUITION TO FACT
One common reaction to Grutter and Gratz was the belief that the Court
simply cleared up the confusion sown by the fact that the Bakke Court was
deeply divided, with no clear majority opinion.4 3 In Bakke's wake a widely

41. See infra text accompanying notes 347-356.
42. 1thank Professor Larry Alexander for reminding me of this. I also note that
one reason why this has happened is the reality that the Supreme Court has consistently
stressed that race is the one characteristic that should virtually never matter. That
makes its use both controversial and, in the light of the rigors of strict scrutiny, an
inviting litigation target.
43. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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shared assumption was that Justice Powell spoke for the Court." This
belief, however, was not universal. 45 Recognizing this, affirmative action's
opponents crafted a concerted litigation strategy that "us[ed] techniques
first honed by leaders of the civil rights movement,, 46 albeit with the
avowed objective of either establishing that the Powell opinion did not
control or, in the alternative, providing the Court with the opportunity to
hold expressly that affirmative admissions policies were unconstitutional.4 7
These efforts eventually brought the Michigan plans before the Court.
Justice O'Connor did declare in Grutter that the Court "endorse[s]
Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions." 48 But the Court
did more than simply provide Justice Powell with a belated fifth vote or use
his opinion as a template. Rather, it employed an analytic matrix within
which what had been an extremely deferential view of the permissibility of
affirmative action was transformed into what I argue is now a rigorous
constitutional standard. Before seeing why this is the case, however, it is
important to briefly review the history of higher education diversity in this
country so that the Grutterdecision can be placed in context.
A. The Early Evolution of Affirmative Action and The Diversity
Rationale
The quest to give effect to the constitutional guarantee that all
individuals are entitled to the equal protection of the laws was initially
understood to mean that race simply should not matter. One of the most
eloquent statements of this principle was made by Professor Alexander
Bickel, who characterized the legal regime in the wake of Brown v. Board
of Education49 as one within which "[t]he lesson of the great decisions of
the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the
44. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 148
(characterizing Justice Powell's opinion as "the law of the land").
45. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword:
Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 13, 47 (1995) ("What is called the controlling
opinion in Bakke, authored by Justice Powell, was in fact joined by no other member of
the Court."). Fried concedes the "influence" of the Powell opinion, but stresses that
"the resolution was an equivocal one." Id. That reality opened the door to what
followed. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Justice
Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue").
46. David Segal, Putting Affirmative Action on Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1998,
at Al. The firm was the Center for Individual Rights, which brought both the challenge
to affirmative action litigated in the Hopwood case, see supra text accompanying note
45, and the two Michigan cases, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2007) and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244
(2007).
47. Id. at A16 (noting that "[a]t CIR, the quarry is University of California
Regents v. Bakke").
48. Grutter,539 U.S. at 325.
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society." 5 That statement accurately captured what had been the central
theme in the movement that fought to make the constitutional promise of
equality a legal, political, and social reality: the assumption that, in the
normal course of events, an individual's race should not be taken into
account when government acts.5 1 Rather, decisions should be made on the
basis of individual talents and qualifications, and not group identity. As the
Court declared in one of the first cases to analyze the Equal Protection
Clause: "What is this but declaring that the law shall be the same for the
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws... ?"2 Eighty-plus years later, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. made what was in effect the same observation, stating
famously that the civil rights movement was a quest for "a nation where
[people] will not53be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of
their character.
The original arguments in favor of affirmative action reflected that goal.
The objective was a system that operated in a fair and open way. The
"overarching policy" was "neutrality."5" The obligation that followed from
this was in turn to create nondiscriminatory policies and practices within
which "decisions are made on merit, with neither positive nor negative
reference to minority determinative characteristics. 5 5 The assumption was
that everything would be fair and open, which "[p]resumably... meant
such things as advertising the fact [that openings exist], seeking out
qualified applicants from sources where they might be found, and the
like." 56 Such policies were affirmative in the sense that steps would be

50. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
51. The stress here on government decisions reflects the fact that the Equal
Protection Clause applies only where government acts. The Court made it clear in both
Grutter and Bakke, however, that the same analysis and principles apply when parsing
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does bind private institutions. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ("Consequently, petitioner's statutory claims based on Title
VI . . .also fail."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.") (quoting General Building Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375, 389-91 (1982)).
52. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
53. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. at 217, 219 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
54. Developments in the Law, Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1300 (1971).
55. Id. at 1300-01.
56. NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1975).
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taken to eliminate bias and see that all qualified candidates could compete
on a level playing field.
The dilemma for higher education was what to do when "the use of
certain standards"-for example, applying the same admissions
requirements to all applicants--"result[s] in the exclusion of women and
minorities from.., or their inclusion only in token proportions to their
,5 Critics maintained that persistent poverty and social
availability ....
disadvantage meant that the playing field could never be level58 and that
decades of discrimination made it necessary to seek both equal treatment
and equal achievement. 59 The goal became "not just equality as a right and
a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result."6 The emphasis
shifted and the central assumption became, as Justice Blackmun noted in
Bakke, that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
61
race."
Early decisions of the Court hinted at what would come. In Sweatt v.
Painter,62 for example, the question was whether the state of Texas could
57. American Association of University Professors, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: A Report by the Council Committee of Discrimination, in AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 155, 155 (1995) [hereinafter AAUP REPORT]. The report

was approved by the Association's Council in April 1973.
58.

See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO.

L. REV.1595, 1605 (1989) (discussing the impact of "class disadvantage" and
arguing that "the qualifications they insist on are precisely the credentials and skills
that have long been denied to people of color"). See also HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
WASH.

DEMOCRACY:

A

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION,

cited in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 970, 977
(Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds., 1961) ("The old, comfortable idea that 'any
boy' can get a college education who has it in him simply is not true.").
59. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Barry L. Zaretsky, PreferentialRemedies for
Employment Discrimination, 74. MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) ("The most effective form
of affirmative action is temporary preferential treatment."); Graham Hughes,
Reparationsfor Blacks, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1968) ("it will probably also be
necessary in the short run to institute a policy of discrimination in reverse in favor of
disadvantaged groups").
60. Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Commencement Address at
Howard University (June 4, 1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1965, 635, 636 (1966).
61. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of
Blackmun, J.).
62. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The Court first addressed discrimination in legal
education in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), in which it held
that the state of Missouri's failure to provide any legal education for African
Americans within the state itself violated the equal protection guarantee. The Court
made it clear, however, that the decision did not rest on the quality or nature of the
education that Missouri's African-Americans could receive in another state. Id. at 349
("The basic consideration is ...what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white
students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color."). While important
then, the case does not overtly embrace what we now recognize as the diversity
rationale.
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establish a separate program of legal education for its African American
residents at Texas State University for Negroes.6 3 The University of Texas
Law School had refused to admit Heman Sweatt "solely because he is a
Negro"' and argued that it could fulfill whatever legal obligations it had
by creating a separate program. The Court rejected that approach. It
stressed that legal education was a complex and interactive process that
required very specific types of resources.6 5 It noted that the University of
Texas Law School was a nationally recognized and unique educational,
political, and social resource.66 And it stressed that no other program in the
state could possibly be considered the "equal" of the one at the University
of Texas, especially one created at the last minute and lacking virtually all
of the characteristics that made the University program nationally visible.67
The Court's ruling used language that reflected the values of what is
now known as "diversity." It emphasized the interactive nature of legal
education and the vital role that access to a variety of perspectives played
in the learning process:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no
one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic
vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of
views with which the law is concerned. The law school to which
Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student
body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the
population of the State and include most of the lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, judges, and other officials with whom
petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member
of the Texas bar. With such a substantial and significant segment
of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education
offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would
receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.68
This commitment to true equality of opportunity was strengthened in a
companion case decided the same day, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Education.69 There, the Court considered whether the
University of Oklahoma could meet its legal obligations when by admitting
George W. McLaurin to a doctoral program in education, but requiring him

63. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
64. Id. at 631.
65. Id. at 633-34.
66. Id. at 634.
67. Id. at 634-35.
68. Id. at 634.

69.

339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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to "sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom"
and to study and eat at separate tables.7" It rejected that approach, finding
that the physical and social isolation of the student made it clear that his
educational opportunities could not, in either theory or fact, be
characterized as equal: "Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students,
and, in general, to learn his profession."71 The Court also stressed the
social dimensions of McLaurin's education in language that foretold
Grutter,noting that
[o]ur society grows increasingly complex, and our need for
trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case
represents, perhaps, the epitome of that need, for he is attempting
to obtain an advanced degree in education, to become, by
definition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come
under his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the
education he receives. Their own education and development
will necessarily suffer72to the extent that his training is unequal to
that of his classmates.
These decisions did not hold that the "separate but equal" doctrine was
invalid. That came a few years later, initially in Brown v. Board of
Education73 for K-12 education and then for higher education in yet
another case involving legal education, Floridaex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control of Florida.74 The Florida Supreme Court had held that "equality of
treatment need not mean identity of treatment" and that the existence of a
"separate but equal" black law school at Florida Agricultural and
Mechanical College meant that the state did not have to admit Virgil
Hawkins to the University of Florida College of Law. 75 The Court, in a
brief per curiam opinion, disagreed, stating that "on the authority of'
Brown, Hawkins "is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and
regulations applicable to other qualified candidates. 76
70. Id. at 640.
71. Id. at 641.
72. Id. The emphasis here is on unequal treatment, rather than diversity per se.
The language nevertheless reflects one of the elements that Justice O'Connor would
stress in her opinion for the Court in Grutter, that "universities, and in particular, law
schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders ....
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003)
(citations omitted).
73. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
74. 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
75. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 60 So. 2d 162, 165 (Fla. 1952).
76. Hawkins, 350 U.S. at 414.
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The core principle in each of these cases was equal treatment.
Affirmative action, at least as it was initially understood and practiced,
reflected that goal. Laurence Silberman, a key figure in the early
development of affirmative action policies in his capacity as
Undersecretary of Labor from 1970 to 1973, summarized what was afoot
when he observed that "[w]e wished to create a generalized, firm, but
gentle pressure to balance the residue of discrimination. 7
Many
maintained that this was not enough, with one blunt assessment arguing
that "black people are disadvantaged as a group and what is therefore most
necessary is that large numbers of them should be assisted along the paths
of economic and educational advancement.,, 78 The general understanding
remained, nevertheless, that affirmative action was a matter of procedure
rather than substance and that, as phrased by the American Association of
University Professors, the "first test of equal opportunity" was that
"standards of competence and qualification," and, by implication,
important decisions taking such matters into account, would be "set
independently of the actual choices made.

'79

B. The Embrace of Intuition-Based Analysis in Bakke
The debate converged in Bakke. The University of California, Davis
Medical School had adopted an admissions policy that was "designed to
assure the admission of a specified number of students from certain
minority groups. ' 8°
The Court held that the program was
unconstitutional. 8' It was, however, deeply divided. Four members of the
Court believed that there was no need to decide the constitutional question.
They argued that the "plain language" of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 meant that "[r]ace cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from
participation in a federally funded program."82 A different group of four
felt that the Davis program was appropriate as both a constitutional and
statutory matter. They maintained that "[g]overnment may take race into
account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to
remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice . -. 3

77. Laurence H. Silberman, The Road to Racial Quotas, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
1977, at 14.
78. Hughes, supra note 59, at 1072.
79. AAUP REPORT, supra note 57, at 156.
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70.
81. Id. at 320 ("The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disregard
of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
82. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined the Stevens
opinion.
83. Id. at 325 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Common ground, and the eventual result, was provided by Justice
Powell. The University argued that its admissions program served four
purposes: "'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession'[;]...
countering the effects of societal discrimination;.., increasing the number
of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and
...obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body." 84
Justice Powell rejected the first three.85 But he accepted the fourth,
finding that the University's argument that the "attainment of a diverse
student body" was "a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education. 86 He stressed that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation,
experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher educationis widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body., 87 He also
accepted the notion that "universities must be accorded the right to select
those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of
ideas,"' a goal "that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of
' 88
[higher education's] mission."
Institutions were thus free to take race into account in the admissions
process, provided they did so by treating group identity simply as a "'plus'
in a particular applicant's file" and did not "insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. 89 The
lodestar for Justice Powell was the admissions policy employed by Harvard
College, where "the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor
just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in
other candidates' cases."9 A university or college needed to act with care.
It could not, for example, set aside a set number of spaces for minority
applicants,9 1 have different admissions standards for different groups, 92 or
have a two track admissions
process, one for minority applicants and a
93
different one for others.
84. Id. at 306 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32).
85. Id. at 307-11.
86. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978).
87. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
88. Id. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. at 323 (quoting Harvard College Admissions Program).
91. See id. at 279 ("16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for" minority
applicants).
92. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 278 n.7 (1978) (minority
applicants "admitted under the special program ...had benchmark scores significantly
lower than many students ... rejected under the general admissions program"); id. at
279 ("minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another").
93. Id. at 274 ("The special admissions program operated with a separate
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The analytic bottom line was that Justice Powell took the claims made
by the higher education establishment at face value: educators believed that
diversity enhanced the college and university experience. That intuitive
judgment and the "widely" shared "beliefs" were not documented in any
meaningful fashion. Rather, Justice Powell relied simply on "tradition and
experience, 94 which "lend support to the view that the contribution of
diversity is substantial."9 5
C. Post-Bakke Reaction
The Bakke Court was deeply divided, but the general consensus in the
wake of that decision was that Justice Powell's opinion controlled. In an
article written before he joined the Court, then-Professor Antonin Scalia
characterized the Powell opinion as an "excellent compromise," one that
"we must work with as the law of the land."96 In her concurring opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,9 7 Justice O'Connor observed that
"although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at
least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial
considerations in furthering that interest."9 8 Those statements captured
what most observers believed the law to be in the wake of Bakke: diversity
was a compelling educational interest, and race could be used as a factor in
admissions, provided the policy in question could withstand the rigors of
strict scrutiny. Indeed, as Justice O'Connor observed in Wygant, "[i]t
appears, then, that the true source of disagreement on the Court lies not so
much in defining the state interests which may support affirmative action
efforts as in defining the degree to which the means
employed must 'fit' the
99
ends pursued to meet constitutional standards."
The belief that the pursuit of diversity was an appropriate, constitutional
goal was not universal. Some argued vehemently that affirmative action
was wrong, as it was a form of reverse discrimination that imposed
inappropriate burdens on qualified applicants who were denied admission
to the educational programs of their choice. "' They maintained that
committee, many of whom were members of minority group.").
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 313.
Id.
Scalia, supra note 44, at 148.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15).
Id. at 287.
See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 286 (1997) (characterizing the arguments
for affirmative action as "an educational disaster" and "the morass in which rigid
academic standards sink"); Paul Craig Roberts & Lawrence M. Stratton, Jr., Color
Code, NAT'L REv., Mar. 20, 1995, at 36 (affirmative action is "reverse discrimination
[that] violates fundamental norms of justice and fair play").

18

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 36, No. I

Justice Powell did not speak for the Court and that his opinion should not
be deemed controlling.10 ' They also alleged that the license granted by the
Powell opinion was being abused by institutions that were treating racial
identity not simply as one factor, but rather as the only meaningful
consideration in the admissions decisions.'0 2
For example, in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 0 3 the District Court for the
Western District of Texas rejected certain aspects of a University of Texas
School of Law admissions process designed to select "the best qualified
from the entire minority pool and... enroll sufficient numbers of those
applicants in the entering class to satisfy the" minority enrollment goals it
had adopted. " On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit agreed that the system was flawed.'0 5 That court could have
confined its ruling to a simple recitation of the ways in which the Texas
policy violated the limitations set forth in Bakke. The Texas system did not
seem to involve a quota or set-aside for minority students. Nevertheless, it
did create a two-track system within which minority applicants were
screened by a separate minority applicant subcommittee and, if not
admitted initially through that process, were placed on what the court
characterized as "segregated waiting lists, dividing applicants by race."'0 6
The law school also used different admissions indices for minority
applicants, lowering the threshold in order "to allow the law school to
consider and admit more of them."'0 7 Indeed, at one point in the
admissions cycle at issue, the index was lowered even further for Mexican
'
American candidates "in order to admit more of this group. 108
The Hopwood panel did not, however, simply recite these facts and hold
that the policy was not narrowly tailored. Instead, it declared that "Justice
Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue" and "that
any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the

101. See, e.g., Carl Cohen, Preference by Race in University Admissions and the
Questfor Diversity, 54 WASH. U. J. URB.& CONTEMP. L. 43, 51 (1998) ("This defense

of intellectual diversity as a support for state-imposed racial classifications was shared
by no other member of the Court in Bakke and by no justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
from that time to this. Justice Powell is lonely in relying upon it.").
102. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, The "Affirmative Action" Fraud, 54 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 31, 31-32 (1998) ("The whole point of all racial preference
programs is to evade and camouflage the fact that the groups preferred by the programs
cannot otherwise compete with others for admission to selective institutions of higher
education on the basis of the standard criteria for academic achievement or ability.").
103. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex 1994).
104. Id. at 578.
105. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
106. Id. at 938.
107.
108.

Id. at 936.
Id. at 936 n.6.
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Fourteenth Amendment." 109
This bold challenge to the accepted wisdom made Hopwood the most
visible of a series of decisions in which the constitutional issues were
raised and conflicting results reached. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, for example, refused to repudiate Bakke."' It conceded that there
had been important developments since Bakke, especially at the Supreme
Court level where "the Court has not looked upon race-based factors with
much favor.""' It concluded, however, that it was for the Supreme Court
itself to "declare that the Bakke rationale regarding university admissions
policies has become moribund" and that "[flor now ... it ineluctably
follows that the Fourteenth Amendment permits University admissions
programs which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and
educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets the
demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures." ' 2
A different approach was taken in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, it
characterized the status of diversity as a compelling interest as "an open
question."' "3 It declared, however, that "[w]e need not, and do not,
resolve.., whether student body diversity ever may be a compelling
interest supporting a university's consideration of race in its admissions
process."" 14 Instead, it held that the policy was not narrowly tailored. The
court stressed that the University "mechanically and inexorably award[ed]
an arbitrary 'diversity' bonus to each and every non-white applicant...
and severely limit[ed] the range of other factors that may be
considered.... ""'
This meant that the "policy contemplates that nonwhite applicants will be admitted or advance further in the [evaluation]
process at the expense of white applicants with greater potential to
contribute to a diverse student body. This lack of flexibility is fatal to
16
UGA's policy." 1
At the same time, a parallel set of developments took place at the polls,
where the general public voiced consistent opposition to affirmative action.
109. Id. at 944.
110. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)
("at our level of the judicial system[,] Justice Powell's opinion remains the law"), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
111. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200 (citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1994); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
112. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01. The Court also noted that the challenge to the
policy at issue had been rendered moot by the intervening vote by the people of
Washington to bar 'preferential treatment' to any individual 'on the basis of race.'"
Id. at 1201.
113. 263 F.3d 1234, 1250 (1lth Cir. 2001).
114. Id. at 1244.
115. Id.at 1254.
116. Id.
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In California, for example, Proposition 209 declared that "[t]he state shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.""' 7 It was approved by fifty-four percent of the individuals
voting." 8' In a similar vein, the voters in Washington state approved
Initiative Measure No. 200 by an equally robust margin." 9 It used the
same language, banning "discrimination" and "preferential treatment." 2 °
These developments suggested that a reexamination of the issues was in
order, and the foes of affirmative action were only too happy to oblige.
The primary challenge came from the Center for Individual Rights, the'
public interest litigation group that had brought the Hopwood litigation. It
selected the University of Michigan as its next target, filing challenges to
the admissions policies employed by its Law School and College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA). That decision turned out to be
particularly significant.
D. Diversity at the University of Michigan Pre-Grutterand Gratz
In the late 1980s, the University of Michigan made a significant
commitment to affirmative action and diversity when it adopted the
Michigan Mandate, a program premised on the assumption that diversity
will become the cornerstone in efforts "to achieve excellence in teaching,
research, and service in the years ahead."''
The Mandate envisioned a
wide range of affirmative measures. As one University administrator
noted, "[t]he fundamental principle of the mandate was that the university
should become a leader in creating a multicultural community that could
serve as a model for society as well as for higher education."' 22 One
117. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 1(a) (1996). A legal challenge was unsuccessful. See
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, 110
F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), amended and supersededby 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), stay denied,

122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1141 (1997).
118.

See Robert Pear, In California, Foes of Affirmative Action See a New Day,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B7.
119. See Sam Howe Verhovek & B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 1998 Elections:
The Nation-Referendums; Voters Back End to State Preferences,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1998, at B2 (noting that the measure was "running ahead, 60 percent to 40 percent").
120. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2008) ("The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group .... ").
Similar measures would eventually be approved in Nebraska and, notably, Michigan.
See infra text accompanying notes 351-360.
121. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, THE MICHIGAN MANDATE: A STRATEGIC LINKING OF
ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY 1 (1990) (Draft 6.0) [hereinafter
A STRATEGIC LINKING].
Earl Lewis, Why History Remains a Factorin the Search for Racial Equality,
in DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, at
DUDERSTADT, MANDATE:

122.

17, 55 (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004).
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integral aspect of this was the desire to "achieve increases in the number of
entering under-represented minority students, as well as in our total under23
represented minority enrollment." 1
Consistent with this, both the Law School and LSA adopted detailed
affirmative admissions policies. In particular, the Law School declared its
intention "to 'achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich
everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger than the
sum of its parts."",124 This focus on the benefits of a diverse learning
environment was in some respects a departure from the strict terms of the
Mandate, which spoke largely in terms of moral justifications. 125 It would,
however, prove to be a crucial decision. In the face of the attacks brought
by CIR, the Law School and University mounted what one observer
characterized as a "full-throated counteroffensive," a vigorous response
that included "the marshaling of statistical evidence of the benefits of racial
diversity."'' 26 As one University official noted, "[t]he lawsuits, ironically,
did force the university to clarify what it had been doing and why, and to
articulate a rationale for the educational benefits of diversity. "127
Two separate cases were filed and two different results emerged at the
district court level. In the first decision, Gratz v. Bollinger,'28 District9
2
Judge Patrick Duggan held that the Powell opinion in Bakke controlled,
that the University had established that diversity was a "compelling
governmental interest under strict scrutiny,"' 30 and that the LSA policy
withstood the rigors of a narrow tailoring analysis.' 31 In the second
decision, Grutter v. Bollinger,'32 a different district judge, Bernard
Friedman, concluded that Justice Powell did not speak for the Court in
Bakke and "that under the Supreme Court's post-Bakke decisions, the
achievement of such diversity is not a compelling state interest because it is
not a remedy for past discrimination."'' 33 Judge Friedman did acknowledge

A STRATEGIC LINKING, supra note 121, at 16.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 315 (quoting the Law School policy).
125. See, e.g., JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, THE MICHIGAN MANDATE: A SEVEN-YEAR
PROGRESS REPORT 1987-1994, at 3 (1995) ("Fundamentally, it is the morally right
thing to do."); DUDERSTADT, MANDATE: A STRATEGIC LINKING, supra note 121, at 3
("First and foremost, the... commitment to affirmative action and equal opportunity is
based on our fundamental social, institutional, and scholarly commitment to freedom,
democracy, and social justice.").
126. Steven A. Holmes, A New Turn in Defense of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1999, at Al.
127. Lewis, supra note 122, at 55.
128. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
129. Id. at 817-22
130. Id. at 824.
123.

DUDERSTADT, MANDATE:

124.

131.

Id. at 824-33.

132. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
133. Id. at 849.
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that "diversity [has] important educational benefits." '34 But he ruled that
the Law School's "use of race has 'not
been... narrowly tailored at any
135
time under consideration in this case."
Both decisions were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which subsequently decided only one of the two, Grutter.'36 The
court considered the case en banc and was bitterly divided. 37 Five judges
held that Bakke provided the appropriate analytic matrix and that "the Law
School's consideration of race and ethnicity is virtually indistinguishable
from the Harvard plan Justice Powell approved in Bakke." '3 8 Four
disagreed, arguing that Bakke did not control, that diversity was not a
compelling interest, and that even if it were the law school policy was not
narrowly tailored.' 39
This set the stage for a reexamination of these issues by the Supreme
Court, which "granted certiorari ... to resolve the disagreement among the
Courts of Appeals on a question of national importance: Whether diversity
is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.' ' 40 In a highly
unusual move, the Court also agreed to hear Gratz "despite the fact that the
Court of Appeals had not yet rendered a judgment, so that this Court could
address the constitutionality
of race in university admissions in a wider
14
range of circumstances." 1
E. The Shift to Fact-Based Analysis in Grutterand Gratz
The two cases were argued together and decided on the same day, albeit
in separate opinions. The key decision was Grutter. Justice O'Connor,
writing for herself and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
disclaimed any need to determine if Justice Powell had in fact spoken for
the Court in Bakke. 4 She preferred instead, "for the reasons set out
134. Id.
135. Id. at 850.

136. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
137. Those disagreements involved both fundamentally different views regarding

the operative doctrines, see, e.g., id. at 788 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("the majority has
given us now argument as to why the engineering of a diverse student body should be a
compelling interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny"), and accusations of bad faith in
how the case was handled. Id. at 810-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("Procedural
Appendix").
138. Id. at 747.
139. Id. at 793 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (diversity principle "poorly defined" and
lacks a "logical stopping point"); id. at 815-18 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (stating that the
policy was not narrowly tailored).
140. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003).
141. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260 (2003).
142. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("We do not find it necessary to decide whether
Justice Powell's opinion is binding under Marks."). The reference is to the rule
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below," to simply "endorse [his] view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions."' 4 3 The manner in which she went about this, however,
departed in significant ways from the approach taken by Justice Powell.
Justice O'Connor accepted the University's argument that "the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce" are
"substantial.""' Quoting the district court, and echoing views expressed
fifty-three years earlier in Sweatt,' 45 she found that:
[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes "cross-racial
understanding," helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
"enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races." . . . These benefits are "important and laudable," because

"classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting" when the4 6 students have "the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds."'
She noted that "numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
And she stressed that "[t]hese benefits are not
professionals."'" 47
theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be
developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
As one prominent social scientist has observed, the
viewpoints."' 48
approach embraced by Justice O'Connor was "a victory for higher
education research," with "the evidence about the need for racial diversity
in education ...cited as compelling evidence by both the appellate court
judge in the undergraduate case and by the Supreme Court, with Sandra
articulated in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), which states that "[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those members who concurred on the narrowest grounds."' Id. at 193 (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. There is some dispute about whether diversity
commanded a sixth vote, that of Justice Kennedy, who observed in his dissenting
opinion that "[o]ur precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a
university's considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its
educational task, when supported by empirical evidence." Id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
144. Id. at 330.
145. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). See supra text accompanying note 68.
146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
147. Id. (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3).
148. Id. (citing Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5;
Brief for General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 34).
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Day O'Connor writing the opinion for the majority in Grutter .... ."'49
The Court's clear and unambiguous embrace of diversity as a
compelling interest was significant. It was, however, only the necessary
first step. The operative standard of review was strict scrutiny, which
meant that the admissions policy would be "constitutional only if [it is]
narrowly tailored to further [the] compelling" interest sought. 5 0 Justice
O'Connor found "that the Law School's admission program bears the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan," employing "race or ethnicity...
flexibly as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of
each and every applicant." '' The Law School, she stressed, "engages in a
highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving
serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a
diverse educational environment" and "affords this individualized
consideration to applicants of all races." 152
The Law School also established that it had complied with three
additional requirements. First, it had engaged in a "serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity the university seeks."' 53 Second, its approach did not, at least in
Justice O'Connor's estimation, "unduly harm members of any racial
group," given "its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity
contributions of all applicants ... ."'I' Third, she stressed that the Law
School itself had recognized that its "race-conscious polic[y] must be
limited in time," '55 a general requirement that "can be met by sunset
provisions ... and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences
are still necessary to achieve student body diversity."' 15 6 Further, she
observed, in what would prove to be a controversial statement, the legal
force of which has been debated, that "[w]e expect that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
149. Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity with the Educationaland Civic Missions of
Higher Education, 30 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 185, 188 (2007) [hereinafter Hurtado,
Linking Diversity].

150. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
151. Id.at334.
152. Id. at 337. For an argument that the O'Connor approach to narrow tailoring
both changes how such matters should be done and is incorrect, see Ian Ayres &
Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85
TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007).
153. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. For an extensive discussion of this requirement, see
George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, Serious Consideration of Race-Neutral
Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 991 (2008). They conclude that
"[w]hether the defendant institution has engaged in the kind of program evaluation that
has seriously considered race-neutral alternatives may welt be decisive in the future
litigation and OCR investigations." Id. at 1044.
154. Grutter,539 U.S. at 341.
155. Id. at 342.
156. Id.
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interest approved today."15' 7
The companion case was Gratz v. Bollinger,158 in which the Court
considered the system employed by Michigan's primary undergraduate
unit, the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA). The focus
here was on the policy in effect at the time the plaintiffs applied, 59 which
used a point system to determine who would be admitted. That system
assigned a set number of points to various factors. In particular, it
"automatically distribut[ed] 20 points" of the 100 required for admission
an 'underrepresented minority' group, as
"to every single applicant from
160
University."
the
by
defined
Writing for a different majority, 161 Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded
that Grutterresolved the compelling interest question. 162 But he found that
He stressed that a
the LSA system was not narrowly tailored.
constitutionally permissible system would make certain that "each
characteristic of a particular applicant [should] be considered in assessing
the applicant's entire application."1 63 The net result of the LSA approach
was, he believed, to "mak[e] 'the factor of race... decisive' for virtually
every minimally qualified minority applicant." 164 Indeed, he stressed, "the
virtually every
University" itself "has conceded [that] the effect. . . is that
1 65
qualified underrepresented minority applicant is admitted."
The University disagreed. It argued that "the fact that every minority
applicant receives the same 'plus' hardly means that race plays the same
role in the admissions outcome for each applicant."1 6 6 It maintained that
157. Id. at 343. The suggestion that there should be a 25 year limit has been
downplayed. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional
Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 541 (2003). One recent study stresses that the real problem lies elsewhere, noting
that "substantial progress in increasing black students' pre-collegiate performance is
critical to any hope of eliminating the need for affirmative action within the next
generation." Alan Krueger & Jesse Rothstein, Race, Income, and Colleges in 25 Years:
Evaluating Justice O'Connor's Conjecture, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 282, 309-10
(2006). For an eloquent explanation of why the problem is not new, nor likely to
change, see Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: ConstitutionalParadigms

and DisadvantagedNeighborhoods, 19 HASTtNGS CONST. L. Q. 599 (1992).
158. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
159. The Court noted that "[t]he University has changed its admissions guidelines a
number of times during the period relevant to this litigation . .
160. Id. at 271.

. ."

Id. at 253.

161. The four dissenters in Grutter--ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas-were joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer.
162. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 ("for the reasons set forth today ... the Court has

rejected" the argument that diversity is not a compelling interest).

163. Id. at 271. He did not, however, cite Grutter for this proposition. Rather, he
drew on Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.
164.
165.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 273.

166.

Brief for Respondents at 37, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-
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the LSA formula was "flexible" and "'considered all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant ... 11167
The sheer weight accorded to race was nevertheless clearly troubling. The
Chief Justice complained, for example, that "[e]ven if' a student's
"'extraordinary artistic talent' rivaled that of a Monet or Picasso, the
applicant would receive, at most, five points under LSA's system."'' 68 The
net effect, he concluded, was that any possible "individualized review"
occurred "only... after admissions counselors automatically distribute the
University's version of a 'plus' that makes race a decisive factor for
minority
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented
169
applicant."
Justice O'Connor agreed. In a concurring opinion that Justice Breyer
joined, she stressed that LSA had failed to provide "the necessary
individualized consideration."17 ° The other three members of the Grutter
majority disagreed, arguing in particular that the LSA point system was an
"accurately described, fully disclosed ... affirmative action program,"''
one that "lets all applicants compete for all places and values an applicant's
offering for any place not only on grounds of race" but on a myriad number
of factors. 172 In particular, Justice Souter declared that a twenty, as
example, a ten point "plus factor" for race was, at best,
opposed to, for
"suspicious."' 73 Any credible doubts, he maintained, could be resolved by
a remand directed toward gathering additional evidence about how the
process actually operated. 174 Those pleas fell on deaf ears. The majority
held that the LSA system was "not narrowly tailored to achieve ... [the]
asserted compelling interest in diversity"' 75 and was, accordingly,
unconstitutional.
"

II. GRUTTER EQUALS "BAKKE, WITH TEETH"
The brief summary of the evolution and treatment of the diversity
rationale that I have provided in Part I of this article does not exhaust the
range of issues raised and debated in the history of affirmative action and
diversity, much less in Grutter and Gratz. There were thirteen separate
opinions in the two cases. Seven of the justices wrote twice, with only
516).
167.

Id. at 38 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273 (2003).
Id. at 274 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 293 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 296-97 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 275.

(1978)).
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Justices Scalia and Kennedy confining themselves to a single expression of
concurrence and dissent.
However, two important points emerge, at least as matters currently
stand. 17 First, the Court has now held, clearly and unequivocally, that
diversity is a compelling educational interest for the purposes of college or
university admissions decisions.177 That is the law of the land and will
remain so unless and until the Court itself retreats from that position. In
this respect, higher education arguably now finds itself in the same17position
8
that elementary and secondary education did in the wake of Brown.
Second, in the wake of Grutter and Gratz, it is not enough for an
institution to simply declare that diversity is a goal and then take race or
ethnicity into account however it chooses as it fashions its entering classes.
It must embrace diversity as an integral part of its mission. Further, it must
do so for educational reasons, and not to correct for "societal
'
discrimination" 179
or to achieve "racial balancing." 18 Institutions must
craft race-conscious admissions policies in a carefully controlled way,
openly linking the particular approach it takes to its educational goals and
the specific outcomes it wishes to attain.

176. Various developments since the decisions were handed down counsel caution
regarding both the implications and the long-term viability of Grutter and Gratz.
Justice O'Connor, for example, has retired and her seat on the Court has been taken by
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Justice Atito has not yet written an opinion in this area, but
he joined, apparently without reservation, Chief Justice John J. Roberts, Jr.'s opinion

for the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo.

1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). The Chief Justice acknowledged that the Court has
"recognized as compelling for the purposes of strict scrutiny ... the interest in diversity
in higher education .... " Id. at 722 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). But he went on
to declare that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race," Id. at 748. This formulation does not bode well

for continuing acceptance of the diversity rationale, if and when the issue returns to the

Court. The recent replacement of Justice David H. Souter by Justice Sonia Sotomayor
does not materially change matters, arguably leaving the issue in the sometimes
mercurial hands of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.
177. The holdings expressly did not extend beyond the admissions decision, a point
Justice Scalia stressed in his dissent in Grutter. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
178. I say arguably because the parallels between the two cases are not exact ones.
The Brown Court was unanimous; the Grutter Court was deeply divided. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the author of the Brown opinion, and the primary force behind its
unanimity, did not resign until 1969, while Justice O'Connor left the Court a scant
three years after writing the Grutter opinion, replaced by Justice Alito, whose support
for the diversity principle will, if anything, be a matter of stare decisis rather than
conviction.
179. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-24 (noting that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion
"rejected as an interest remedying societal discrimination").
180. See id. at 329-30 (rejecting diversity plans that seek "some specified

percentage of a particular group" as "outright racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional").
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These would normally be regarded as the natural requirements of sound
educational policy and practice. The reality is, however, that many of these
principles are often ignored. I will now argue, accordingly, that higher
education must take two critical factors into account as it crafts the sort of
race-conscious admissions policies that Grutter contemplates.
The first is that Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the notion that the
benefits of diversity are "real" should put higher education on notice that
admissions policies that employ preferences are now subject to a much
more rigorous evaluation standard that the one that prevailed in the years
between Bakke and Grutter. It is no longer enough to theorize that actual
education outcomes will ensue. Rather, institutions that undertake racebased admissions must acknowledge and account for the reality that their
ability to defend such policies and practices now depends on their ability to
associated with those policies and procedures
demonstrate that the benefits
181
are actually occurring.
The second is that it would be a mistake to assume that judicial
treatment of future challenges to either the diversity principle itself or a
particular admissions policy will be in any meaningful respects
"deferential."
Justice O'Connor did state that "[t]he Law [S]chool's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
'
As I will stress, however, read with
mission is one to which we defer."182
in
context,
that
statement
does
nothing more than leave as a matter
care and
of educational choice a given institution's decision about the mission it
wishes to pursue. It does not in fact relieve that institution of the obligation
to comply with the rigors of strict scrutiny.
A. The Benefits of Diversity "Are Real"
If we compare the approach taken by Justice Powell in his Bakke opinion
with that of Justice O'Connor in Grutter, it becomes clear that Grutter is
Bakke with teeth. Justice Powell did stress that "[r]acial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and this calls for the most
exacting judicial examination." '83 He did not, however, consistently
181. In effect, I am arguing that this is one of the "hallmarks" of narrow tailoring,
see supra text accompanying note 31, and should be expressly added to the list spelled
out by Justice O'Connor. I acknowledge, as Professor Goodwin Liu stressed in a
thoughtful review of this Article, that in many important respects the University of
Michigan was not required to meet this burden, and that much of the social science
evidence it relied on in making its case was not actually reviewed by the Court in any
meaningful manner. I believe, however, that the landscape has changed. I believe that
institutions should act in this manner as a matter of course and not simply as a litigation
strategy. That said, I also believe, and argue in this Article, that the courts must now
pay much closer attention to these matters.
182. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
183. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291(1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
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employ the language and approaches of strict scrutiny in his discussion of
diversity as a "constitutionally permissible" '84 interest. Nor did he
characterize his examination of the various aspects of the Davis plan that
he found objectionable as an assessment of the extent to which the program
was not "narrowly tailored."
Instead, Justice Powell did two things. First, he discussed the extent to
which "[a]cademic freedom," which he characterized as "a special concern
of the First Amendment," '85 allowed a college or university "to make its
own judgments as to education includ[ing] the selection of its student
'
body."186
Then he offered the "illuminating example" of the admissions
program at Harvard College, which takes "race into account in achieving
the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment ... ,187

He

quoted the Harvard policy at some length and then discussed it in general
terms, concluding that it "treats each applicant as an individual in the
admissions process."' 8 8
The net effect, he stated, was that the
qualifications of an "applicant who loses out... would have been weighed
to complain of
fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis
89
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Powell simply took as gospel the text preached by the higher
education establishment. He did not require that the parties supporting
affirmative action and diversity actually document the extent to which their
intuition about these matters was supported by a detailed accounting of the
actual benefits that would be attained. Nor did he ask them to provide any
evidence that such outcomes actually occurred. Rather, he simply accepted
the premise of the Harvard policy, that students with different
"background[s] and outlook[s]" bring an undefined "something" with them
when they matriculate.

190

Justice O'Connor did something quite different. She did not simply note
and embrace the Michigan Law School plan as an "example" to be
followed. Instead, she made the transition from educational theory to
educational fact, stressing that the actual benefits for all students enrolled
in a racially diverse educational setting are "substantial" and are "not
theoretical but real." 9 ' She found support for this in a variety of forms,
including: evidence adduced at trial about actual results; 9 2 "numerous

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id.at 316.
Id.at 318.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 323 (quoting the Harvard College Admissions Program statement).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).

192. Id.
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19 3
studies that show that student diversity promotes learning outcomes";
and the perspectives offered by various amici that documented the positive,
post-graduation effects flowing from "exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." '94
Michigan and its amici consciously developed, and Justice O'Connor
appears to have been persuaded by, detailed evidentiary support for its
claim that diversity had real, demonstrable, and positive effects. This stood
in stark contrast to the evidence accepted by Justice Powell. For example,
the Harvard College policy he quoted at length spoke in general terms
about the ability of "[a] farm boy from Idaho" and "a black student" to
"bring something" to Harvard that "a white person cannot offer."' 95 The
only other "evidence" offered in support of diversity's educational effects
was equally vague, with the then-President of Princeton University
learning that might flow from
outlining various types of "informal"
"unplanned, casual encounters."'1 96

Justice Powell's rather cursory treatment of the narrow tailoring inquiry
also contrasts sharply with the approach taken by Justice O'Connor. Some
of this is almost certainly due to the evolution of Equal Protection doctrines
over the twenty-six years between Bakke and Grutter. Strict scrutiny was
Its current
an accepted fact when Bakke was decided in 1977.197
parameters are, however, more detailed and demanding in the light of
intervening cases. 19' The extent to which the present analytic framework is
especially demanding is revealed in the four very specific requirements for
narrow tailoring emphasized in the O'Connor opinion: truly individualized
evaluation;' 99 careful examination of race neutral alternatives before
adopting a race-conscious policy;2 00 the need to avoid inflicting harm on

193. Id.
194.

Id. at 330-33.

195. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (quoting the
Harvard College Admissions Program statement).
196. Id. at 312 n.43 (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of
Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
197. Justice Powell acknowledged this when he noted that "[r]acial and ethnic

distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial scrutiny." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. And he refused to accept the University's

contention that a different standard should be apply. See id. at 294-99 (discussing the
argument that "discrimination against members of the white 'majority' cannot be
suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign."').

198. See, in particular, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493

(1989) (stressing the need to apply strict scrutiny as the only "way of determining what

classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated
by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics'), and Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (emphasizing the need to subject
all affirmative measures to strict scrutiny).

199.
200.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-39.
Id.at 339-40.
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other applicants; 2°' and recognition that the program must be limited in
duration and subject to periodic, rigorous review.20 2
Justice Powell alluded to various aspects of these elements in his
discussion. 203 But he did not couch his analysis in these terms. Nor did he
in any meaningful sense make compliance with such standards mandatory.
Justice O'Connor noted as much when she observed that "[s]ince Bakke we
have had no occasion to define the contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry
with respect to race-conscious university admissions programs. 20 4 She
then emphasized the nature of what she characterized as "the hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan" 205 in a highly detailed, ten page discussion of the
Michigan approach.
The differences between the Powell and O'Connor opinions are, then,
pronounced and important. Justice Powell was willing to accept at face
value the what the pro-diversity litigants before him maintained. Justice
O'Connor did not. Rather, she wrote an opinion within which these
matters are treated as fact rather than intuition. It was on that basis that she
accepted the argument that diversity is a compelling educational interest.
And it is in the light of that approach that affirmative admissions policies
will be judged in the future.
B. GrutterAllows Judicial Deference Only to an Institution's
Chosen Mission
One controversial element of the O'Connor opinion was her statement
that "[t]he Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer." 206 Justice
Kennedy was especially outraged, believing that this marked a sharp
departure from the rigors of strict scrutiny and that the Court's "review" of
these matters was "nothing short of perfunctory. 20 7 Some commentators
agree with Kennedy, alleging, for example, that "the Court has effectively
dropped the standard of review from strict scrutiny to rational basis
review."
201.

208

Id.at 341.

202. Id. at 341-43.
203. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) (expressing support
for admissions programs that are "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant").
204. Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
205. Id. at 334.

206. Id. at 328.
207. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). See also id. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority's analysis as "conclusory").
208. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A CriticalAnalysis, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 459, 468 (2004). See also JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 5 (noting the
deference language and stressing that the opinion "establishes a presumption of good
faith on the part of universities in selecting their student bodies"); Pamela S. Karlan,
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These criticisms are clearly misplaced. First, the "deference" afforded
did not extend to whether diversity itself should be deemed a compelling
interest. The precise statement is worth repeating: "The Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission is one to which we defer."2 °9 Justice O'Connor did not declare that
the Law School's judgment that diversity itself is a compelling educational
interest is one to "which we defer." Rather, she deferred to Michigan's
choice of mission. She quite correctly treated this as something Michigan
was free to do. Both Justices Scalia and Thomas recognized this in their
dissents. Justice Scalia argued that the real issue was "Michigan's interest
in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose normal admissions standards
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities."2 ' Justice Thomas
agreed, complaining that "[t]he interest in remaining elite and exclusive
that the majority thinks so obviously critical requires the use of admissions
'standards' that, in turn, create the. . . 'need' to discriminate on the basis of
211
race."
Justice O'Connor's "deference" statement was descriptive. It simply
acknowledged that the University of Michigan had chosen to embrace
The
student body diversity as part of its institutional identity.
constitutional question was whether what followed from this decision could
withstand strict scrutiny. The first step for Michigan was to define its
institutional mission. The second was to structure its admissions policies
and practices in ways that would allow it to admit a diverse group of
students. It is only at this second stage that the active use of race as a
The focus for Justice
decision-making criterion enters the picture.
O'Connor was then whether the consequences that follow from Michigan's
judgments about its educational mission, and its concomitant practices, are
constitutional. That is, is the pursuit of student body diversity, achieved
through the active consideration of race, in practice a compelling interest?
This becomes clear when we look at what Justice O'Connor actually did
in her opinion. The very next sentence after the "deference" statement, sets
the stage for what follows: "The Law School's assessment that diversity
will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and

Compelling Interests/CompellingInstitutions: Law School as ConstitutionalLitigants,

54 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1622 (2007) ("What is striking here is not that the Court thinks
racial diversity within the student body of a selective public educational institution can
be a compelling governmental purpose, but rather that it declares that racial diversity is
compelling because a school thinks it is."); Luis-Fuentes Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E.
Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 136 (2004) ("In this
Essay, we defend the Court's deference to the judgment of educators and admissions
officials on the necessity of raceconscious admissions.").
209. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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their amici."212 Justice O'Connor thus makes a quick transition from
deference regarding mission to a detailed consideration of the extent to
which the means selected to pursue one aspect of that mission are
constitutional. That is, is the belief that diversity has constitutionally
If so, the interest is
cognizable benefits supported by the facts?
compelling, which then requires a discussion of the extent to which the
particular means selected are narrowly tailored.
Her discussion of these questions was lengthy and detailed. She noted
the explicit findings of the District Court, which were based on an
extensive record.213 She referred to "numerous studies show[ing] that
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes and 'better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals.' 214 She noted the considered judgments of
a wide variety of actors to the effect that the benefits of diversity "are not
theoretical but real., 215 And she subjected the actual policy to a series of
specific narrow tailoring requirements that were discussed at some length.
Viewed in this light, whatever respect Justice O'Connor accorded
Michigan's educational judgments about its mission did not in reality
operate as a justification for setting aside the requirements of strict
scrutiny.
The actual discussion was, moreover, far more rigorous and demanding
than that applied by Justice Powell in Bakke. The contrast between the two
approaches is stark and telling. Justice Powell accepted what he was told.
Justice O'Connor in turn described what the University postulated and then
explored, in considerable detail, whether the positions embraced were
supported by the facts.
Any questions about whether this is the case are easily resolved when
one looks with care at any number of decisions in which the Court has
engaged in true deferential review. Those cases that make it quite clear
that the level of scrutiny in Grutter was far more exacting than the analysis
212. Id. at 328.
213. See id. at 330 (noting "the expert studies and numerous reports entered into
evidence at trial").
214. Id. (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as

Amici Curiae at 3). Additional sources noted were:

WILLIAM

G.

BOWEN

& DEREK

BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON

THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

and

COMPELLING

(Gary Orfield & Michael Kurlaender eds., 2001);

INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN

(Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003). The AERA brief
and these three books did in fact compile virtually all of the direct social science
evidence available at the time. One of the welcome ironies of Grutter and Gratz is that
the decisions have spurred a virtual explosion of research in the field.
215. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (citing briefs filed by
various corporations and "high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the
United States military").
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
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undertaken by the Court in any number of other situations.
For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,2 16 an Orthodox Jew and
ordained rabbi pressed his claim that the United States Air Force's refusal
to allow him to wear his yarmulke while on duty infringed his First
Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. The Court held that
the challenged regulations "reasonably and even-handedly regulate dress in
the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity., 21 7 The
majority observed that "[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on
First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review
of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society. ,218 It stressed
that "[t]he considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the
traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the
subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall
group mission. ,219 And, in a key passage, it emphasized that "whether or
not expert witnesses may feel that religious exceptions to [the regulation]
are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress regulations
in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are
under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional
22
judgment., 1
This is true deference. The majority declared in no uncertain terms that
the opinions of the outside world did not matter, expert or otherwise. Once
the military determines that a particular course of action is essential,
judicial inquiry is at an end. Justice Brennan recognized this in his dissent,
where he complained that the Court had "eliminat[ed] in all but name only,
judicial review of military regulations that interfere with the fundamental
He characterized the
constitutional rights of service personnel., 22
deference articulated in Goldman as "a subrational-basis standard" and
complained that "it seems that the Court will accept" the Air Force's
judgment "no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be." 222
The point is not whether the Goldman standard is or is not appropriate.
It is rather that examples of true deference abound in the decisions of the
Court, including, but not limited to, cases involving the military, primary
and secondary education,22 3 and prisons. 224 In prison litigation, for
216. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
217. Id. at 510.
218. Id.at 507.
219. Id.at 508.
220. Id. at 509.
221. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986).
223. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (holding that "schools
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use."); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (standard for actions governing "schoolsponsored expressive activities" is whether an educator's "actions are reasonably
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example, the search is for a "logical connection" between the "expert
opinion" of prison officials and the burden imposed on what would
otherwise have been deemed a fundamental right subject to the rigors of
strict scrutiny.225 That is quite different from what the Court actually did in
Grutter, where, given the need to adhere to the rigors of strict scrutiny, the
majority felt obliged to discuss at considerable length the extent to which
Michigan's educational judgment was supported by the evidence,
ascertaining that the educational benefits are "substantial" and "not
22 6
theoretical but real.

Any doubt that this is the case is dispelled by Overton v. Bazzetta,22 ' a
prison case decided just one week before Grutter. The issue before the
Court was the extent to which prison officials in Michigan could restrict
visits to prisoners, in particular visits by their children. The Court
recognized that, outside the prison, such measures would burden a
fundamental right-namely, the ability "to maintain certain familial
relationships, including association among members of an immediate
family and association between grandchildren and grandparents. ' '228 It did
not find it necessary to explore the extent to which that right survives
imprisonment, however, because the operative standard was whether "the
challenged regulations bear a rational relationship to legitimate penological
interests. '229

The regulation was accordingly permissible given the

"logical connection" between "maintaining internal security" and
protecting children from harm.23 °
It is also important to recognize that the post-GrutterCourt has insisted
that the rigors of strict scrutiny cannot, and should not, be relaxed when
decisions based on race are at issue, even in prisons. That was the message
conveyed two years after Grutter in Johnson v. California.231 Writing for
the Court, Justice O'Connor insisted that Grutter stood for the proposition
that "strict scrutiny [applies] in every context, even for so-called 'benign'
racial classifications." '32 She then refused to apply a rule of deference
appropriate in other prison contexts to a policy of racially segregating

related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
224. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (adopting standard that asks
whether a burden on a prisoner's fundamental rights was "reasonably related" to
"legitimate penological interests").
225. See id. at 92-93.
226. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
227. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
228. Id. at 131 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
229. Id. at 132 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
230. Id. at 133.
231. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
232. Id. at 505.
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2 33
prisoners during the initial classification process following incarceration.
The same thing happened when the Court considered an attempt by two K12 school districts to extend the logic of Grutter to those settings and
insisted that the rigors of strict scrutiny should apply.234
The approach actually taken in Grutter is then far more rigorous than its
critics care to admit. Justice O'Connor's use of the term "deference" was
unfortunate. 235 But her actual opinion for the Court did not signal a
willingness on its part to blindly accept whatever story Michigan wished to
tell, either as an absolute matter, or in the light of how the Court has
handled other cases in which what otherwise might have been deemed
suspect constitutional issues were adjudicated.
Grutter is then Bakke with teeth. Bakke embraced the assumption that
diversity is a compelling interest because certain institutions thought it was
a good idea and minority students might bring, for example, an unspecified
"something" to the then predominantly white Harvard College.236 That
view has been replaced by a standard within which diversity is accepted as
a compelling interest because the assumptions for which it stands are
supported by positive evidence regarding actual outcomes. Narrow
tailoring, in turn, has become more than a simple list of the flaws endemic
to the quota system employed by UC Davis. Instead, affirmative
admissions policies and practices will now be evaluated within a detailed,
multi-step matrix that will ask in each instance whether the policy and
program at issue comports with "the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored

plan.

23 7

233. Id. at 509-15 (refusing to apply the Turner rule of deference to prison
decisions predicated on race).
234. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
744 (2007) ("Such deference 'is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection
jurisprudence. We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based
policies are justified."' Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005))).
235. One possible explanation for invoking "deference" is that it offered the
majority a way to deal with the problem posed by the Law School's contention that it
did not engage in "racial balancing" in the latter stages of a given admissions cycle as it
pursued a "critical mass" of minority students. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36. A
careful reading of the opinion reveals that this is the one area where the majority took
Michigan at its word, relying on assertions by the law school's admissions officers that,
while pursuing a "critical mass," they did not "seek to admit any particular number or
percentage of underrepresented minority students." Id. at 318-19 (discussing the
testimony of Dennis Shields and Erica Munzel).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 181-188.
237. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
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1II. INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMMING AND ASSESSMENT FOR
INSTITUTIONS UTILIZING RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
POLICIES

I would be remiss, having argued that Grutter is Bakke with teeth, if I
did not then at least sketch out some of the major implications of this
reality for higher education. This discussion is not meant to be definitive.
Rather, my goal is to outline some threshold considerations and leave a
more detailed examination of these concerns to a future article. My core
assumption is that a college or university using race as a factor in
admissions decisions must clearly articulate how a racially diverse student
body supports its institutional mission and must then specify the
educational outcomes it expects will flow from such diversity. Further, the
institution must construct and implement an institutional
plan for
2 38
measuring whether those outcomes are in fact occurring.
My analysis proceeds in three steps. First, in Part Ill-A, I note and
explain the special significance of Grutter and Gratz for legal education.
This focus is natural for me, as I teach in a law school and am very familiar
with the assumptions and practices that inform legal education. It is also
highly appropriate for two reasons. First, admission to law school is almost
invariably a selective process, involving the screening of a large number of
applicants seeking a comparatively small number of seats in any given
entering class. This means that they likely use preferences much more
frequently than might otherwise be the case."' This isan important reality,
given that the strictures imposed by Grutter and Gratz apply only when an
institution voluntarily adopts race-conscious admissions criteria. Even
then, that presumably happens only after it has given "serious, good faith
consideration [to] workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the

238. The first requirement was both imposed on Michigan and met by it. The
second, as Professor Liu correctly notes, is a burden that the Court did not actually
impose on Michigan. That is in some respects unfortunate. It also likely reflects the

fact that resolving the wider question of diversity as a compelling interest per se was
far more important at that point than holding Michigan's feet to the fire regarding the
details of the evidence they offered. Indeed, this "next generation" issue may well be
one of the reasons why the nature and force of the social science evidence received
much greater attention in Parents Involved. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 552 U.S. 701, 760-767 (2007); id. at 837-840, 850-852
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
239. Bowen and Bok, for example, stressed that "[o]ne of the most common
misunderstandings concerns the number of institutions that actually take account of
race in making admissions decisions. Many people are unaware of how few colleges
and universities have enough applications to be able to pick and choose among them."
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 214, at 15. They concede that "[t]here is no single,
unambiguous way of identifying the number of such schools, but we estimate that only
about 20 to 30 percent of all four-year colleges and universities are in this category."
Id.
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diversity the [institution] seeks." 24
Simply put, law schools are precisely the sorts of institutions most likely
to find themselves confronting the problems posed by the adoption of raceconscious admissions policies, even if they do not aspire to the "elite" 24'
status of an institution like the University of Michigan Law School.
Moreover, given changes in the law school accreditation standards adopted
by the American Bar Association in response to Grutter and Gratz,242 law
schools now find themselves in a world within which the active pursuit of
diversity appears to be a mandate, rather than an option. Law schools will
also soon find themselves confronting the implications of an additional,
pending ABA shift in accreditation focus, from an input to an output based
approach.243 This is in some respects not a new experience, since law
schools have always had to take into account a post-graduation screening
device, the bar examination, that served as a reference point regarding the
success or failure of its students and, by necessary implication, its
educational programs.2 44 Such changes will nevertheless require a shift in
focus that, I believe, presents law schools with both an obligation and an
opportunity to undertake precisely the sorts of programs and studies I
associate with the rigors of Grutterand Gratz.
In Part Ill-B, I examine key aspects of the social science research
supporting the notion that diversity is a compelling constitutional interest.
I focus on certain central elements of that research, identifying information
and perspectives that can assist law schools as they intentionally structure
their learning environments to enhance the likelihood that they are
achieving the educational outcomes cited in Grutter and the new ABA
240. Grutter,539 U.S. at 339.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 210-211.
242. See infra text accompanying note 275.
243. See infra text accompanying note 271.
244. One persistent and sobering fact in the diversity debate has been the reality
that "relatively large proportion of examinees of color, particularly black examinees...
failed the bar examination on the first attempt and did not make a second attempt."
LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 79
(1998). Both Richard Sander and his critics report similar findings. Sander is the
author of a very controversial study suggesting that affirmative action may do more
harm than good by admitting minority students to legal education programs for which
they are ill-prepared and within which they struggle to succeed. Richard H. Sander, A
Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV.

367 (2004). Professors Ayres and Brooks have strongly criticized his work, but also
note that "Sander's study... highlights a real and serious problem: the average black
law students's grades are startlingly low." Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does
Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807,
1807 (2005). As Sander stresses, "[m]ost" scholars "concede (and none dispute) the
basic facts ... blacks are nearly two-and-one-half times more likely than whites not to

graduate from law school, are four times more likely to fail the bar on their first
attempt, and are six times more likely to fail after multiple attempts." Richard H.
Sander, A Reply to Critics,57 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1964-65 (2005).
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Standards. Finally, in Part II-C, I address the value of program assessment
in law schools, a practice that has not heretofore been a cornerstone in legal
education.
A. Legal Education and Diversity: The Post-GrutterRealities
Higher education's commitment to diversity is pervasive and longstanding. 245 The American Association of University Professors was one
of the early leaders attacking traditional policies and procedures, declaring
in 1973 that, in its view, these "result in the exclusion of women and
minorities from [academe] or their inclusion in only token proportions to
their availability., 246 More recently, sixty-two of North America's most
prestigious universities responded to the threats posed by the Hopwood
litigation and voter initiatives banning affirmative action with a statement
emphasizing that "as educators ... [w]e believe that our students benefit
significantly from education that takes place within a diverse setting. "247
They declared that "[a] very substantial portion of our curriculum is
enhanced by the discourse made possible by the heterogeneous
backgrounds of our students. 2 48 And they asserted that "[i]f our
institutional capacity to bring together a genuinely diverse group of
students is removed-or severely reduced-then the quality
and texture of
2 49
the education we provide will be significantly diminished.
Legal education has if anything been even more proactive than the rest
of higher education in these matters. A broad spectrum of key actors in
legal education filed briefs supporting the positions taken by the University
of Michigan in the Grutterand Gratz litigation. These filings stressed both
the moral and practical dimensions of legal education's commitment. For
example, the primary "trade association" for legal education, the
Association of American Law Schools, argued that "[r]ace-conscious
admissions policies are necessary to achieve the paramount government
objective of ensuring equal access to legal education, the legal profession,
and the process of self-government."2 5 A group of law deans echoed these
sentiments, stressing "the harm to legal education, to the [law] schools as
institutions, and to society" if race could not be considered in the
admissions process. 251
The Law School Admissions Council, which
245. See infra text accompanying note 78.
246. AAUP Report, supra note 57, at 155.
247. Association of American Universities, On the Importance of Diversity in
UniversityAdmissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A17.

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Brief of the Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
251. Brief of the American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-24 1).
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develops and administers the primary screening tool for law school
admissions, the Law School Admissions Test, stressed its "strong interest
in ensuring that standardized test scores are given the proper weight in the
admissions process, and... longstanding commitment to ensuring equal
access to legal education for members of minority groups."2'52 It then
argued that "[t]he inescapable lesson of the statistical evidence compiled
year after year by LSAC is that unless America's law schools are allowed
to adopt race-conscious admissions policies, many of the nation's lawyers
will be trained in an environment of racial homogeneity that bears almost
no relation to the world in which they will work, and in which all of us
25 3
live."
The most telling arguments were arguably those made by the American
Bar Association. It stressed that it "has worked to ensure that members of
all racial and ethnic groups are represented in the legal profession., 254 It
declared that "[f]ull participation in the legal profession by racial and
ethnic minorities is a sine qua non for the effective functioning of the legal
system and for the legitimacy of our system of government. 255 And,
echoing a reality documented by a number of other parties by the Court,256
it stressed that "[s]hould the Court proscribe these race-conscious
admissions programs, the likely result will be a precipitous decline in the
number of lawyers from under-represented racial and ethnic groups. 2 57
These sentiments eventually became an accreditation reality. In August
2006, slightly over one year after Grutter and Gratz were decided, the
ABA House of Delegates approved Standard 212(a), which states that all
law schools "shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to
providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the
profession by members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and
252. Brief of the Law School Admissions Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 535 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter
LSAC Brief].
253. Id.
254. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter
ABA Brief].

255. Id. at 8-9.

256. See, e.g., LSAC Brief, supra note 249, at 3 ("The simple, demonstrable
statistical fact is that most selective law schools in this country will have almost no

students of certain races unless they adopt admissions policies designed to alter that
outcome."); id. at 8-9 (indicating, for example, that "[f]or the fall 1997 entering class,
the year petitioner applied to Michigan Law School, there were 3,447 applicants
nationwide in" the statistical range threshold for admission to Michigan, only "17 of
whom were black").
257. ABA Brief, supra note 254, at 5. It is worth noting that the focus here seems
to be on "representation" and "participation," rather than on the educational process
itself. That is, the ABA argued largely for what I will describe as "structural" diversity.
See infra text accompanying note 286.
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ethnic minorities, and a commitment to having a student body that is
diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.

' 258

Although the

Interpretations of Standard 212 states that the Standard "does not specify
the forms of concrete actions a law school must take,

'259

the ABA does not

appear to treat the pursuit of diversity as optional. It has made it quite clear
that the mandate applies even in the face of "a constitutional provision or
statute that purports to prohibit consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or
national origin in admissions or employment decisions. '"260 And it has in
fact insisted on substantial alterations in admissions practices as part of the
261
accreditation process.
The official explanation for the revision was that the prior standard,
which spoke simply of the need for an "equal opportunity effort," 262 had
"not been revised in 15 years [and] needed to be updated in the light of"
Grutter and Gratz.263 Its exact meaning has, in turn, been disputed,2 64
258. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2008-09 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION, Standard 212(a)
[hereinafter
ABA
STANDARDS],
available
at

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standards.html.
A parallel provision,
Standard 212(b), imposes a similar requirement regarding the need to have "faculty and
staff that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity."
259. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Interpretation 212-13.
260. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Interpretation 212-1.
261. The most visible and controversial example of this is the case of the George
Mason University Law School, which was criticized when "the site evaluation team for
the ABA" discovered that "only 6.5% of the law school's entering students were
minorities." Kenneth L. Marcus, The Right Frontierfor Civil Rights Reform, 19 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 77, 109 (2008). In the wake of that finding, "the school was
forced to implement significant racial preferences, despite its opposition to such
practices." Id. See also Gail Heriot, Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 17
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 274-79 (2008) (discussing George Mason's
experiences).
262. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW, Standard
211, at 36-38.
263. Katherine S. Mangan, Bar Association Moves to Strengthen Diversity
Requirementsfor Accreditation of Law Schools, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 12, 2006 (citing John Sebert, ABA Consultant on Legal Education), availableat
http://chronicle.com/daily/2006/02/2006021401 n.htm.
264. For example, Professor David Bernstein, who teaches at George Mason,
argued that the revised standard meant that "[r]acial preferences will thus generally be
necessary to comply" with the accreditation standards. David E. Bernstein, Affirmative
Blackmail, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2006, at A9. John Sebert, who was the ABA
Consultant on Legal Education at the time the standards were revised, disagreed,
declaring that Bernstein "got it completely wrong" and that "the revised standard
clarifies that law schools may consider race and ethnicity in admissions . . . but does
not require them to take that approach." Mangan, supra note 263 (quoting John
Sebert). Sebert went on to state, however, that the net effect of Interpretation 212-2
was exactly what it said: "the mere fact that you may be in a state that has a statutorial
provision prohibiting the consideration of race in the admissions process does not
relieve you" of the obligation to enroll a diverse student body that has the traits
mentioned in the standard. Id.
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prompting Dean Steven R. Smith, speaking as a representative of the ABA,
to assail "misconceptions" about the nature and effect of the revisions in
265
testimony before the United States Commission on Civil Rights.
Nevertheless, the mandatory nature of the requirement seems clear: law
schools shall demonstrate a commitment to affirmative action and diversity
by taking concrete steps towards those ends. Moreover, while Dean Smith
was arguably correct that "[t]he ABA is hardly unique in expecting the
institutions it accredits to be committed to diversity, 26 6 the examples he
lists of such requirements do not speak in such stark terms. The business
college standard, for example, states simply that "[a]s a condition of
eligibility to pursue business and accounting accreditation (and for
maintenance of accreditation as well) the school must first define and
support the concept of diversity appropriate to its culture, historical
traditions, and legal and regulatory environment. ' 267 The one that comes
closest to the ABA approach, in turn, is in the standards for programs in
Journalism and Mass Communications.268 Even here, however, the
standards require simply that a program have a "written plan for achieving
an inclusive curriculum, a diverse faculty and student population"2 69 and
"demonstrates effective efforts to help recruit and retain a student
population eligible to enroll in institutions of higher education in the region
or population it serves, with special attention to recruiting underrepresented groups."27
265. Steven R. Smith, Opening Statement Before the United States Civil Rights
Commission, at 84, 87-89, in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS: A BRIEFING REPORT (April 2007).
266. Id. at 87.
267. ASSOCIATION TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, ELIGIBILITY
PROCEDURES AND ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR BUSINESS ACCREDITATION 13
(Revised, July 1, 2009), available at http://www.aacsb.edu/accredidation/BusinessStandards-2009-Final.pdf.
268.

THE

ACCREDITING

COMMUNICATIONS,

COUNCIL ON

ACEJMC

EDUCATION

IN JOURNALISM

ACCREDITING STANDARDS (Sept.

AND

MASS

2003), available at

http://www2.ku.edu/-acejmc/PROGRAM/STANDARDS.SHTML.
269. Id. at Standard 3(a).
270. Id. at Standard 3(d). Dean Smith listed four other accrediting bodies, none of
whose standards approximate those of the ABA. See COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN
LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MASTER'S PROGRAMS IN

& INFORMATION STUDIES 9 (Jan. 15, 2008) (Standard IV.i, "The school has
policies to recruit and retain students who reflect the diversity of North America's
LIBRARY

communities.");

LIAISON COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL EDUCATION, FUNCTIONS AND
STRUCTURE OF A MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE 17 (June 2008) (Standard MS-8,

"Each medical school must develop programs or partnerships aimed at broadening
diversity among qualified applicants for medical school admission."); MIDDLE STATES
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: REQUIREMENTS OF AFFILIATION AND STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION 31-

33 (Revised, March 2009) (Standard 8, Student Admissions and Retention, silent
regarding diversity); id. at 37 (Standard 10, Faculty, stating "[f]aculty selection
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That said, the ABA approach is certainly consistent with the rhetoric that
invariably accompanies discussions of diversity by the higher education
establishment. In this respect, these standards seem to be suggestive
harbingers of what the future likely holds. Higher education figures clearly
believe that diversity is an essential element in educational excellence. It
seems only logical then that these same individuals would expect
accreditation standards and processes to take these beliefs into account.
It is also worth noting that the ABA is now moving from an "input" to
an "outcomes" model for law school accreditation.27 1 Although the
specific requirements that this will impose have not yet been determined,
law schools will presumably be required in the future to prove through
outcomes data that their graduates have indeed acquired both the
theoretical knowledge and professional skills necessary to function as
attorneys. This shift reveals a professional and educational commitment to
assessing program outcomes "by the facts" or by the numbers. In the past,
legal education was arguably subject to only a single quantitative measure
of the actual success of its educational programs, the bar examination. A
shift to an outcomes based accreditation model will likely add additional
parameters. It would be remarkable if the ABA, having made such an issue
of diversity, did not also take the benefits associated with it into account in
any outcomes-based approach. And, as law schools gear up to measure the
outcomes of their educational programs, it would be remarkable if they did
not also measure the educational benefits of their race-conscious
admissions policies and practices, policies and practices that they have
argued are central to their missions.
B. Institutional and Programmatic Considerations in Planning for a
Diverse Learning Environment
As I indicated in Part I of this article, the Grutter majority relied heavily
'
on "expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial."272
In
particular, Justice O'Connor and her colleagues stressed that the applicable
social science showed that the "benefits" of student body diversity are
"substantial," leading to cross-racial understanding and to reductions in
processes should give appropriate consideration to the value of faculty diversity,
consistent with institutional mission"); PLANNING ACCREDITATION BOARD, THE
ACCREDITATION

DOCUMENT:

CRITERIA

AND

PROCEDURES

OF

THE

PLANNING

27 (Nov. 2006) (Standard 9.4, "The program shall
document its progress in reaching its aspirations for the quantity, quality, and diversity
of its student body.").
271. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ACCREDITATION

PROGRAM

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 1 (July

27,

2008) ("T[his] report recommends that the Section re-examine the current ABA
Accreditation Standards and reframe them, as needed, to reduce their reliance on input
measures and instead adopt a greater and more overt reliance on outcome measures.").
272. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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racial stereotypes, as well as enabling students to better understand persons
of different races.273 They also declared that student body diversity "better
prepares students for an increasingly2 7diverse
workforce and society, and
4
better prepares them as professionals.
These findings are significant in and of themselves, as they provided the
foundations for a holding that the student body diversity is a compelling
constitutional interest. Their importance has in turn been amplified by the
ABA, which modified its accreditation standards to take them into account,
declaring in language which tracks closely to Justice O'Connor's opinion
that "a law school shall take concrete actions to enroll a diverse student
body that promotes cross-cultural understanding, helps break down racial
and ethnic stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of
'
different races, ethnic groups, and backgrounds."275
The Court's use of social science materials as a basis for judicial
decision-making has been and remains controversial.2 7 6 For example, some
scholars have characterized this portion of the Grutter opinion as
"secondary" and the use of social science evidence as "cautious."27' 7 There
are good reasons to be careful. Considerable skill must be exercised, given
both the methodological errors that can taint some social science
research,27 8 and the need to make certain that the studies relied on are in
fact generalizable to the environment at issue. 79 That said, I believe that
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Interpretation 212-2 (emphasis added).
276. The literature discussing this is substantial and a full examination of the issues
beyond the scope of this article. Two useful starting points for those wishing to review
the history and arguments, pro and con, are Anne Richardson Oakes, From
PedagogicalSociology to ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation
in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61 (2008), and Sanjay
Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the
Supreme Court's Questfor Legitimacy, 54. STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002).
277. Steven L. Willbom, Social Science in the Courts; The View from Michigan, in
SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

144 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007).
278. A number of individuals, for example, have criticized the quality of the
materials that Michigan relied on. See, e.g., James H. Kuklinski, Review: The Scientific
Study of Campus Diversity and Students'EducationalOutcomes, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 1
(2006); Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 625 (2005-06); Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or Proof-The Social
Science Justificationfor the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.

Bollinger, 59

STAN. L. REV. 761 (2006-07).
279. For example, most of the studies used by Michigan and its amici to bolster
their case before the Court involved undergraduate education. See, e.g., Brief for
Respondents at 22, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (noting the
"powerful and essentially uncontested evidentiary record in this case" and the expert
reports filed at the district court level, which discussed only undergraduate education).
The district court opinion in turn cited only the trial testimony of various administrators
and faculty at the Law School, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 833-36
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the critics of social science in the courts are wrong, both as a general
matter,28 ° and specifically in the context of Grutter and Gratz. As I have
argued and documented in this Article, social science materials helped
inform Justice O'Connor's approach to these issues. More to the point,
they can provide valuable assistance to law schools as they structure and
assess their efforts to make the benefits they associate with diversity a
reality for their students.
For example, the claim that a diverse learning environment can in fact
influence actual educational outcomes has a strong basis in core social
science research. I do not intend to explore those materials at length here.
Instead, I simply note that it has long been a central tenet in developmental
psychology that there are important post-childhood stages during which
attitudes are influenced and values formed. For example, the pioneering
work of Erik Erikson established that adolescents and young adults
experience a number of important developmental stages, during which a
sense of both personal and social identity is developed.281 One of the key
experts in the Michigan litigation was Professor Patricia Y. Gurin. As she
explained in the study she prepared for those cases, Erikson theorized that:
[Ildentity develops best when young people are given a psychosocial moratorium-a time and a place in which they can
experiment with different social roles before making permanent
commitments to an occupation, to intimate relationships, to social
groups and communities, and to a philosophy of life. Ideally, the
moratorium will involve confrontation with diversity and
complexity, lest young people passively make commitments that
follow their past, rather than being obliged to think and make
decisions that fit their talents and feel authentic.282
The unique nature of legal education, furthermore, means that there is
(E.D. Mich. 2001), and a single social science study, the Gurin Report, see id. at 850,
which examined only undergraduate experiences. The perspectives offered by such
materials are valuable and instructive. It remains to be seen, however, whether all of
the conclusions drawn from the studies of undergraduate students apply equally to law
students in a professional school setting.
280. I tend to agree with Judge Posner that in areas like this "[t]he big problem is
not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge-lack of the very knowledge that [social
science] research, rather than the litigation process, is best designed to produce."
Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
There are nevertheless good arguments on both sides of this debate that I do not have
the time or space to explore in this article.
281. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUTH: CHANGE AND CHALLENGE (1963); ERIK H.
ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed.
THE LIFE CYCLE: SELECTED PAPERS (1959).

1963);

ERIK

H.

ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND

282. Expert Report of PatriciaGurin, in THE COMPELLING NEED

FOR DIVERSITY IN

at 101 (John A. Payton ed., 1999), reprintedin 5 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 363 (1999) [hereinafter Gurin Report]. The Payton compilation was the original
document prepared for the trial court.
HIGHER EDUCATION,
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still room for the diversity imperative to operate. Marvin Peterson, for
example, notes that professional schools have a particularly strong
socializing influence on their students.283
Indeed, a number of
commentators have emphasized the extraordinary psychological impact of
law school on students. James Elkins describes the first year of law school
as "a powerful, transformative experience in which the soul as well as the
'
mind is at stake."284
John Bonsignore agrees, arguing that within the first
few months of attending law school, there is a "vigorous institutional effort
to cut the individual loose from all ... psychological anchoring points."28' 5
Law school, these individuals maintain, epitomizes a clash of competing
cultures, creating a contest of wills between a student's values and the
institution's values. The net effect, as described by Rand Jack and Dana
Crowley Jack, is that "no one who attends law school for three years
'
completely escapes the thorns that excise prior vision and implant new."286
This literature suggests that legal education's strong institutional culture
may substantially influence student attitudes and beliefs, even after
relatively brief exposure to the environment. More to the point, certain
aspects of how legal education is provided may play an important role in
influencing students' racial attitudes and beliefs. Paul Brest and Miranda
Oshige maintain that "law students, like members of all segments of
society, hold stereotypes, preconceptions, and prejudices based on group
membership."28' 7 Thus, they argue, an institutional culture that embraces
diversity and fosters "encounters among students from different
backgrounds [will] tend to reduce prejudice and alienation."288
There are, however, two major problems that must be addressed. The
first is that there may be some law schools whose administrators believe
that the admissions decision is dispositive. This leads to an emphasis on
"structural diversity," generally defined as the numerical representation of
a critical mass of minority students. 289 The underlying assumption at such

283. MARVIN W. PETERSON, ASHE READER ON ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION (5th ed. 2000).
284. James R. Elkins, Rites of Passage:Law Students "Telling Their Lives," 35 J.
27, 28 (1985).
285. John J. Bonsignore, Law School: Caught in the ParadigmaticSqueeze, in
BEFORE THE LAW, at 259 (John J. Bonsignore et al. eds., 3d. ed. 1984).
286. RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
LEGAL EDUC.

DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS

47 (1989).

The

"thorns" in question are those of the "bramble bush." See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930).
287. Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 855, 863 (1995).
288. Id.
289. This is also called "representational diversity" or "numeric diversity." Even
here, there are nuances. For example, "unitary" structural diversity simply measures
the number of white students to the number of minority students. See Pidot, supra
note 278, at page 767. "Heterogenic" diversity considers the number of different racial
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institutions is that structural diversity alone will provide "students with
opportunities to interact with peers who are different from themselves and
that these interactions ultimately contribute to a supportive campus
environment and mediate students' intellectual
and personal
development. ' 29'
This is arguably the focus of the current ABA
accreditation standard, which addresses only the admissions process and
decision and seems to assume that all of the benefits it embraces will
inevitably follow. The ABA acknowledged when it undertook the recent
revisions that this effort was undertaken in the light of the goals that
diversity is presumed to achieve. 291 But the segments of the current ABA
standards actually dealing with the "Program of Legal Education" are silent
in this regard, emphasizing simply the need for an "educational program
that "prepares its students for admission to the
bar, and effective and
292
responsible participation in the legal profession.
Institutions and individuals who are content with simple structural
diversity do not necessarily dispute the need for or value of "provid[ing] an
environment in which students learn how to approach legal problems, as
well as life itself, from multiple perspectives or viewpoints." 29 3 Rather,
they suggest that structural diversity, "in and of itself," 29 4 is sufficient to
meet their constitutional obligations.2 95 And they seem to believe that the
educational goals that flow from diversity will be easily achieved "given
the inevitable ways in which a critical mass of minority students will lead
all students to confront and embrace alternative perspectives and
'
viewpoints."296
and ethnic groups represented in the student body. Id. Finally, "multifactored"
diversity considers the race and ethnicity of individuals as well as other attributes
including socioeconomic, geographic, and ideological considerations as well as a
diversity of skills, interests, and experiences, including the demonstrated ability to
overcome different kinds of disadvantages. See Kenneth L. Marcus, Diversity and
Race-Neutrality, 103 Nw. L. REv. COLLOQUY 163, 164 (2008).
290. Gary R. Pike & George D. Kuh, Relationships among StructuralDiversity,
Informal Peer Interactions and Perceptionsof Campus Environment, 29 REV. HIGHER
EDUC. 445, 426 (2006).

291. See supra text accompanying notes 255 and 260.
292. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Standard 301(a) (Objectives). Hopefully
the revision process currently underway, which will result in a shift to an outcomesbased accreditation model, will take these matters into account.
293. Caminker, supra note 26, at 38.
294. Id. at 41. See also id. at 50 (noting that "Michigan Law School's admissions
program passed constitutional muster despite the absence of proactive programming").
295. Id. at 40 (arguing that Grutter made structural diversity "sufficient" for
constitutional purposes).
296. Id. at 41. It is not my intention here to pick on Dean Caminker and make him
the spokesman for all legal education. That said, as Dean at Michigan, his statements
are presumably accorded great weight in these matters, and I believe that individuals at
that institution in particular should not convey the impression that structural diversity is
sufficient. More importantly, Dean Caminker is not the only prominent spokesman
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Admitting a wide array of students is clearly an important first step. As
one recent study notes, "[s]tructural diversity is perceived as a catalyst for
promoting a more hospitable campus racial climate. '297 That same study
stresses, however, that "[d]espite its importance" research has revealed
"that the singular act of increasing the number of people of color on a
campus will not create a more positive racial climate. ,298 Structural
diversity is accordingly "a necessary, but not sufficient, factor" if the goal
is to actually create "a more comfortable and less hostile environment for
all. 299
This perspective is not new. Patricia Gurin was one of the experts
whose research Michigan supported and relied on as it fashioned its
litigation strategy.3"0 She argues that "[i]f diversity is really going to mean
anything, it is not just having students [of different races] in the same place.
They have to interact. They need to learn to have deep and meaningful
conversations about topics that people want to avoid."' ' As she and her
colleagues noted even before Grutter was decided, "[a]lthough structural
diversity increases the probability that students will encounter others of
diverse backgrounds, given the U.S. history of race relations, simply
attending an ethnically diverse college does not guarantee that students will
have the meaningful intergroup interactions that.., are important for the
reduction of racial prejudice." 30 2 These interactions must, moreover, be
conducted with care, as simply "[t]alking about these topics can blow up if
you don't do it right."30 3
The single most important consideration for all institutions, and in
particular for law schools, is then to understand that it is not enough to
simply admit a diverse class. The constitutional expectation in the wake of
Grutter and Gratz is that the benefits associated with diversity will be real,
with Michigan connections to speak in this vein. See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 28, at
1591 (describing the goal of diversity as "help[ing] students expand their capacities to
imagine other ways of experiencing life and of seeing the world" and stating that
"being around people who are in some ways different from you, or whom you perceive
to be different, is one of many ways of developing this mentality").
297. Sylvia Hurtado et al., Assessing the Value of Climate Assessments: Progress
and FutureDirections, 1J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 204, 207 (2008).
298. Id.
299. Id. See also Jiali Luo & David Jamieson-Drake, A Retrospective Assessment
of the EducationalBenefits of InteractionAcross Racial Boundaries, 50 J. COLL. STUD.
DEV. 67, 84 (2009) ("Structural diversity is only the first step in a journey of a
thousand miles to capitalize on the educational value of multicultural diversity.").
300. See supra text accompanying notes 279 and 282.
301. Peter Schmidt, 'Intergroup Dialogue' Promoted as Using Racial Tension to
Teach, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. DAILY NEWS, July 16, 2008, available at
http://chronicle.com/daily/2008/07/3829n.htm.
302. Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact of
EducationalOutcomes, 72 HARv. EDUC. REV. 330, 331 (2002).
303. Schmidt, supra note 301 (quoting Patricia Gurin).
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that is, that they will actually occur. The educational policy expectation in
turn is that there will be proactive programming. The clear consensus on
the part of the experts in the field of measuring the educational benefits of
student body diversity is that structural diversity is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to achieve the educational benefits that institutions
presumably seek when they consciously fashion a diverse student body.3" 4
Rather, "substantial and meaningful interaction" between different racial
and ethnic groups is central to the "development of democratic
sensibilities"3 5 that is the professed objective of diversity. Moreover,
developmental theories indicate that social interaction is necessary to elicit
the cognitive disequilibria that spur growth and development in students.30 6
This is why I noted at the outset of this Article that the manner in which
the Court proceeded in Grutter and Gratz made those cases a "good newsbad news" scenario for higher education in general and legal education in
particular. Higher education in general, and legal education in particular,
are arguably committed to diversity because educators believe that it will
have a positive educational impact on its students. If that is indeed the case
then law schools must take positive steps to see that there is substantialand
meaningful interaction between students of different racial and ethnic
groups. At the risk of repetition, these sorts of contacts are the keys to
student socio-cognitive growth.
Diversity research builds "on the theory and research of developmental
and cognitive psychologists" who have found that "discontinuity" is
necessary to encourage "more active thinking processes among students,
moving them from their own embedded worldviews to consider those of
another (or those of their diverse peers). 30 7 Dissonance "occurs when
304. See, e.g.,

ALEXANDER ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE? FOUR CRITICAL

362 (1997); Nida Denson & Mitchell J. Chang, Racial Diversity
Matters: The Impact of Diversity-Related Student Engagement and Institutional
Context, 46 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 322, 324 (2009) (a diverse environment is primarily
YEARS REVISITED

important as it increases the chances that students will engage in more frequent crossrace interaction); Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 190 ("[I]t is clear that
enhancing the structural diversity of a student body is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to produce these outcomes.").

305. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 190. See also Lisa B.
Spanierman et al., Participation in Formal and Informal Campus Diversity
Experiences: Effects on Students' Racial Democratic Beliefs, 1 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER

108, 124 (2008) ("[P]articipation in formal campus experiences is important for
White, Black, and Latino students in predicting critical awareness of racial issues and
diversity appreciation.").
EDUC.

306.

See ARTHUR W. CHICKERING & LINDA REISSER, EDUCATION AND IDENTITY

(Jossey-Bass 2d ed. 1993); ROLF E. H. MUUss, THEORIES OF ADOLESCENCE (Random
House 5th ed. 1988); WILLIAM GRAVES PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (Holt Rinehart & Winston 1970);
and JEAN PIAGET, THE EQUILIBRATION OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURES: THE CENTRAL
PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1985).

307. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 189.
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students encounter unfamiliar and novel situations, people, and experiences
and they cannot continue to rely on familiar ways of thinking and
acting. '' 3° The sorts of learning and individual growth associated with
diversity take place when individuals recognize cognitive conflicts or
contradictions.30 9 These encounters "may lead to a state of uncertainty,
instability, and anxiety.3 1 However, "with the right amount of support and
challenge, these moments of instability can lead to many dimensions of
growth."

311

There are a number of ways in which law schools can facilitate the sorts
of encounters that I have described here. The most obvious and most
frequently discussed is through the content and process of classroom
instruction. Much of the attention in the post-Grutterliterature has focused
on this. Professor Brown, for example, has argued that Critical Race
Theory should be an integral aspect of instruction across the curriculum.3" 2
Professor Chambers-Goodman has suggested a number of ways in which
classroom instruction can be shaped to maximize the potential benefits of
diversity. 31 3 And Professor Bruckner has touted the value of cooperative
learning, arguing in particular that this approach best takes into account
3 14
critical differences in the cultures and learning styles of diverse groups.
In each instance, however, the argument is, as it should be, that the positive
outcomes sought are best pursued as a matter of conscious planning and
course design, rather than happenstance.
For example, both positive institutional support of cross-race student
interaction 315 and directed intergroup dialogues 3 6 have been found to
308.

Id.

See also Gurin Report, supra note 282, appendices available at

http:www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/gurinapd.html. Gurin discusses
evidence about automatic thinking can be challenged by "discontinuity" and
"incongruity" that can lead students to more sophisticated thinking. Id. at 369-70.
309. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 190.
310. Id.

311. Id.
312. See Brown, supra note 25, at 27-34. See also Carla D. Pratt, Taking Diversity
Seriously: Affirmative Action and the Democratic Role of Law Schools: A Response to
ProfessorBrown, 43 HOus. L. REV. 55 (2006).
313. Chris Chambers-Goodman, Retaining Diversity in the Classroom: Strategies
for Maximizing the Benefits that Flowfrom a Diverse Student Body, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
663 (2008).
314. Carole J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger's "Compelling Educational
Benefits of Diversity"--Transforming Aspirational Rhetoric into Experience, 72
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 877 (2004).
315. See, e.g., Mitchell J. Chang et al., Cross-racial Interaction Among
Undergraduates: Some Consequences, Causes, and Patterns, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC.
529 (2004); Nisha C. Gottfredson et al., The Effects of Educational Diversity in a
National Sample of Law Students: FittingMultilevel Latent Variable Models in Data
with CategoricalIndicators,44 MULTVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 305, 319 (2009); Somnath
Saha et al., Student Body Racial and Ethnic Composition and Diversity-Related
Outcomes in U.S. Medical Schools, 300 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 1135, 1139 (2009); Patrick
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provide the necessary "cognitive dissonance" that has been shown to
promote the broad-based set of socio-cognitive skills, democratic values,
and enhanced complex thinking skills noted in both Grutter and the ABA
Standards.
Structured intergroup dialogues in particular provide
'
"opportunities for facilitated, extended discussions about diversity" 317
and
318
are associated with increases in students' perspective-taking skills.
This
pedagogical technique could be used in the classroom setting to help equip
students with the tools for engaging in civil discourse about difficult social
issues.319 Indeed, virtually any technique that calls attention to the
interaction between law and racial or ethnic status could be utilized in one
or more courses, providing parameters for targeted discussion to probe
social dimensions of law and policy that might otherwise go unnoticed.32 °
The research stresses, however, that success is almost invariably associated
with active institutional involvement.
It is also critical to understand that both positive and negative effects
may occur from increased diversity. 3 1 For example, Professor Sylvia
Hurtado, a nationally known scholar and past president of the Association
for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE), recently noted that "students
who reported positive, informal interactions with diverse peers had higher
scores on measures of more complex thinking about people and their
behavior, cultural awareness, and perspective-taking skills (i.e., the ability
to see the world from someone else's perspective)."3'22 In contrast,
"students who had negative interactions with diverse peers (conflict or
hostility) were not only least skilled in intergroup relations but also
demonstrated lower scores on the outcomes, indicating that they were also
least likely to develop the habits of mind to function in a diverse and global

J.Terenzini et al., Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Classroom: Does It Promote
Student Learning?, 72 J. HIGHER EDUC. 509 (2001).
316. See, e.g., INTERGROUP DIALOGUE: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN SCHOOL,
COLLEGE, COMMUNITY, AND WORKPLACE

(David Schoem & Sylvia Hurtado, eds.,

2001); Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking
in College Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 507 (2004); Schmidt, supra note 301 (discussing

the Gurin intergroup dialogue project).
317.

Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 192.

See also Schoem &

Hurtado, supra note 316.
318. Id. See also Victor B. Saenz et al., Factors Influencing Positive Interactions
Across Race for African American, Asian American, Latino and White College
Students, 48 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 1 (2007).
319. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 192. See also Schoem &

Hurtado, supra note 313.

320. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 24; Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit ofRacial
Healing within Critical Race Theory: An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11
MICH. J.RACE & L. 21 (2005).
321. Denson & Chang, supra note 304, at 324.
322. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 191.
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world."3'23 Positive student interactions, embraced and supported by key
institutional constructs, are then crucial to achieving positive, as opposed to
negative, learning outcomes.
Two recent studies involving professional-level students are instructive.
The first involved a national sample of law students and found that "racial
diversity increases intergroup contact" and "that intergroup contact
increases perceived diversity of ideas" and "decreases prejudiced
attitudes." 324 The authors note that "the perceived openness of the
325
intellectual atmosphere" is key to the reduction in prejudiced attitudes."
These results are consistent with one of the central tenets in developmental
psychology, the "the contact theory," which posits that positive attitude
change among group members is most likely to be achieved when there are
institutional supports in place that foster and embrace such cognitive and
attitudinal change.32 6
A second study surveyed over 20,000 graduates from 118 allopathic
medical schools in the United States and found, after adjusting for student
and school characteristics, that white students who attended the most
diverse schools had greater odds of high self-rated cultural competence
compared with students at schools with less racial diversity. 327 In addition,
white students in the high diversity schools also had higher odds of having
strong attitudes endorsing equitable access to care compared with those in
the lowest diversity schools.3 28 Further, the authors found a "significant
interaction between school institutional climate" and white students' selfrated cultural competence.32 9 Specifically, the presence of a higher
proportion of underrepresented racial minority students "was associated
with higher self-rated cultural competence among white students when the
institutional climate was perceived to be more positive." 33
These studies suggest the types of programming that might be
undertaken. I cannot at this time offer a specific curricular and institutional
plan for law schools to follow to ensure that educational benefits of racial
diversity are occurring at their institutions. Indeed, I shouldn't: one of the
most important considerations is that diversity efforts match institutional
mission, a key dynamic that will vary from institution to institution. I can
emphasize that the relevant social science studies do tell us that students
must be able to interact with students of other races in a variety of ways.
Sometimes the topics will be specifically related to race. In other instances
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Gottfredson et al., supra note 315, at 319.
Id.
Id. See also GORDON D. ALLPORT, THE NATURE
Sahaetal.,supranote315, at 1139.
Id.
Id. at 1140.
Id.

OF PREJUDICE (1954).
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they will not. The one constant, however, is that these interactions take
place in a positive and supportive institutional environment. This requires
a significant amount of intentional institutional effort, and it is important
for law schools to recognize and act on this reality.
To their credit, many key figures in legal education seem to recognize
this. Dean Caminker, for example, acknowledges the existence, and
"critical importance" of this "second-generation question," conceding that
"[tlhere is a meaningful distinction between simply creating a diverse
community and actually getting the community to function so as to achieve
the goals of diversity."331 He then dilutes the force of that concession by
arguing that structural diversity is all that Grutter and Gratz require.332 I
disagree. I see in those opinions the expectation that law schools will
undertake the programming necessary to achieve their professed goals.
Even were that not the case, I see such activities as the only educationally
responsible way in which to proceed.
I do agree with Dean Caminker that the problems associated with this
'
"second phase" are likely to prove "vexing."333
Professor Gurin's
observations about both the risks and rewards inherent in diversity
programming are telling.334 Such programming is, nevertheless, the
necessary next step for law schools if they are to achieve anything more
'
than what has appropriately been characterized as "classroom aesthetics"335
33 6
and "viewbook diversity.
C. Assessment and the True Commitment to Diversity
Without assessment, the rhetoric extolling the centrality of raceconscious admissions plans rings hollow. As noted above,3 37 social science
provides us with some basic considerations for structuring the educational
experiences to support the important learning outcomes linked to racial
diversity. In particular, these studies reveal that diversity may have no
effect, or even negative effects, on learning outcomes if careful attention is
not paid to the nature of cross-race student interaction and dialogue.338 If
institutions using race-based admissions policies truly are committed to
achieving the outcomes that they assert are related to diversity, then they
must create and carry out an assessment plan that will measure whether
331. Caminker, supra note 26, at 38.
332. See supra text accompanying note 290-96.
333. Caminker, supra note 26, at 38.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 300-03.
335. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
336. See Scott Jaschik, Viewbook Diversity vs. Real Diversity, INSIDE
EDUC.,
July
2,
2008,
available
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/02/viewbooks.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 273-277.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 309-320.
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these outcomes are indeed occurring. More to the point, they must make
certain that they have the information necessary to assist them in the event
that find it necessary to re-examine their institutional climate and programs
and move toward actually achieving these outcomes if they are not already
occurring.
The ultimate goal of an outcomes-based assessment scheme is to
measure learning outcomes and to use the results of the assessment to plan
improvements and make recommendations for future action consistent with
the findings of the study. 339 There a number of steps in any sound
academic assessment plan, including: articulating the institution's or
program's "mission"; based on that mission, specifying the intended results
of discrete academic programs or practices; purposefully planning
curricular or institutional points of access so that those results (or
outcomes) can be achieved; implementing methods to systematically
identify whether the end results have been achieved; and finally, using the
results to plan improvements in the programs or practices that will create
3 40
enhanced opportunities for these outcomes to occur.
Both Grutter and the ABA Standards articulate the key outcomes that
should be associated with race-conscious diversity initiatives at law
schools. 341 Again, at the risk of repetition, these include: promoting crossracial understanding; breaking down racial stereotypes; enabling students
to better understand persons of different races; promoting better classroom
discussion; better preparing students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society; better preparing students to become professionals; and finally,
providing pathways to positions of leadership in society. Depending on the
school's mission, an individual law school might choose somewhat
different outcomes or articulate them in a different manner. Either way, a
truly narrowly tailored diversity plan must stress the development and
identification of the curricular and institutional processes by which students
can make progress along the articulated learning dimensions.
Assuming an institution adopts the learning outcomes noted by Grutter
and embraced by the ABA, it might include a range of curricular
interventions. For example, it could incorporate at least one targeted racial
awareness dialogue in an established orientation program for first year
students, and follow that with requiring student participation in a course
that utilizes Critical Race Theory, or any other related technique, in the
analysis of substantive law. If institutions do not have such targeted and
institutionally supported opportunities for students to benefit from racial
diversity, such curricular interventions and institutional climate issues must

339.

MARILEE

PROGRAM REVIEW:

J. BRESCIANI, OUTCOMEs-BASED ACADEMIC AND Co-CURRICULAR
A COMPILATION OF INSTITUTIONAL GOOD PRACTICES 14 (2006).

340. Id.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 265-272.
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be developed and addressed.
Thereafter, an assessment plan must be created and implemented. The
key here is to understand that the assessments must be longitudinal.34 2 That
is, meaningful data must be collected both before and after exposure to the
diversity experience in order to determine whether the experience itself
produced the learning outcomes. Careful attention must also be paid to the
means of testing for the required outcomes. For example, a survey that
simply asks the students just prior to graduation to "self assess" whether
they are "more open to people of another race" or "whether they are less
prejudiced now than when they entered law school" is replete with
methodological errors.3 43 Rather, the institution must develop methods of
testing whether the learning outcomes were achieved without the responses
being subject to "social desirability" effects. Affirmative action and
diversity are controversial and contentious subjects. Studies that probe
those topics directly run into concern with respondents who give a "socially
desirable" answer rather than a "true" answer. As Maria Krysan notes,
"self-reports of any socially sensitive topic, including race, are subject to
social desirability pressures. 344 Individuals wish "to be and appear to be
good people. 3 45 This is sometimes problematic in an environment where
institutional leaders create the impression that opposition to affirmative
action or diversity runs the risk of being labeled, for example, as "telling
the world, 'Women and minorities need not apply." 34 6
342. That is, there must be some basis for comparison, as basic social science

principles instruct that "[c]omparisons need to be made between students who

experience different types of education. The term comparison should be stressed
because survey research done on a single group often leads to invalid conclusions about

cause-and-effect relationships." BRUCE W. TUCKMAN, CONDUCTING EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH 235 (4th ed. 1994).
343. See, e.g., id. ("The more transparent or obvious the purpose of a questionnaire,
the more likely respondents are to provide the answers they want others to hear about
themselves rather than the ones that may be true."). See generally EDWARD L.
VOCKELL & J. WILLIAM ASHER, EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 1995).
344. Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding the
Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 135, 138 (2000).
345. SEYMOUR SUDMAN & NORMAN H. BRADBURN, ASKING QUESTIONS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

6 (1982).

346. Mary Sue Coleman, Oppose Prop 2; affirmative action helps economy,
at
2006,
available
ST.
J.,
Sept.
24,
LANSING
Such rhetoric is,
http://www.diversity.umich.edu/research/msc-editorial.php.
unfortunately, coin of the realm for both supporters and opponents of affirmative action
and diversity. Compare Thomas C. Wilson, Whites' Opposition to Affirmative Action:
Rejection of Group-basedPreferences as well as Rejection of Blacks, 85 SOC. FORCES

111, 111 (2006) ("Research clearly shows that whites' opposition to race-based
preferences is motivated by 'new, but not old-fashioned' racism."), and Deirdre M.
Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning

Affirmative Action, IND. L.J. (characterizing opposition to affirmative action as the
feelings of "Whites who felt displaced from their throne of entitlement [and] began to
push back") (forthcoming 2010), with Paul Craig Roberts & Lawrence M. Stratton, Jr.,
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Further, law schools should collect a range of data from incoming
students, assess again after each year of law school, and then collect data
upon graduation. The information should be detailed and wide-ranging. In
addition to basic background characteristics, the law school should gather
attitudinal data on entry to law school, including attitudes that might be
subject to change based on the various programming efforts undertaken, for
example, in-depth intergroup dialogues, or the use targeted instruction
techniques in the classroom. It should then measure the same attitudes
again at the end of law school. A supplemental approach is to use a series
of vignettes that are stacked with a range of issues for the students to
identify and discuss. So, for example, analysis of such vignettes might
show a marked sophistication in student analysis of those scenarios by
displaying a greater level of critical thinking and the reduction in the use of
racial stereotypes. Students might also offer a more nuanced solution to a
problem-involving scenario, such as a client interview, that requires
students to draw upon cross-cultural experiences and knowledge. Data
documenting such positive changes would provide solid information to
show that the learning outcomes are being achieved. Finally, since some of
the outcomes, such an improved ability to work in a diverse setting, suggest
they might be achieved after graduation, data collection should continue at
regular intervals post-graduation.
When the data is collected and analyzed, the schools can use it to target
strengths and weaknesses in the law school experience. As part of this
process law schools should seek assistance from internal sources who have
program assessment or statistical experience and/or they should call upon
campus or community resources to assist them in this process. This
process might not be easy, but a program of outcomes assessment will
underscore a true commitment to diversity for those institutions using race
as a factor in admissions decisions.
IV.CONCLUSION

One of the true ironies in the debate about affirmative action and
diversity is the deep disconnect that exists between higher education's
embrace of diversity and the general public's seeming lack of support for it,
especially if achieving diversity involves the use of race-related
preferences. Higher education has always led the way in what Justice
Blackmun characterized as the need for "first taking race into account. 34 7
Color Code, NAT'L REv., Mar. 20, 1995, at 36 (characterizing affirmative action as

"reverse discrimination [that] violates fundamental norms of fair play"), and David G.
Rosenbaum, Files From 80's Lay Out Stance of Bush Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2005, at AI (quoting a 1981 report written by now Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., to
the effect that "the 'obvious reason' affirmative action programs had failed was that
they 'required the recruiting of inadequately prepared candidates."').

347. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of
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The commitment on the part of legal education is, if anything, even more
pronounced given the decision to mandate the pursuit of diversity as part of
the accreditation process.348 The general public, however, does not seem to
share these convictions. In May 2009, for example, the Pew Research
Center released the results of polling data that found that while "public...
support of the principle of equal opportunity for all" remains high,349 only
31% of the public supported minority preferences and 65% of them
opposed them. 35° These data reflect consistent realities in recent years:
public support for racial preferences is comparatively low, and the
opponents of such preferences have had near complete success at the polls
when they place ballot measures banning affirmative action before the
voting public.35
The University of Michigan's own experiences in the wake of Grutter
and Gratz are instructive in this regard. Slightly over one year after the
decisions were handed down the people of the state of Michigan approved
a ballot initiative amending the state constitution, declaring that "[t]he
University of Michigan ... shall not discriminate

against, or grant

preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
'
color, ethnicity, or national origin."352
The measure was styled as the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative and was championed by, among others,
Jennifer Gratz, the named plaintiff in the case challenging the

Blackmun, J.).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 255-258.
349.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, TRENDS IN POLITICAL

1987-2009 at 56 (May 21, 2009), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/517.pdf (noting that "[n]early nine-in-ten (87%)
agree that: 'Our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an
equal opportunity to succeed').
350. Id. The report notes that the trend since 1987 has been fairly constant, with
support increasing slightly, from 24% to 31%, while opposition has declined slightly,
from 71% to 65%. Id.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 115-118 (discussing the ballot measures
and votes in California and Washington). The only state-wide measure to be defeated
was the one on the Colorado ballot during the general election in November, 2008,
which failed by a narrow margin. The defeat was a setback for the anti-affirmative
action movement, but may also have been a product of the unique dynamics created by
the Obama campaign's substantial efforts to win the state. See Reeves Wiedman,
Colorado'sSingular 'No', CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 21, 2008, at A4 ("Supporters
of affirmative action have finally found a way to defeat state ballot measures that
would ban such programs: Latch onto an inspirational presidential candidate with piles
of cash and an unprecedented voter-turnout machine."). In Nebraska, a state in which
VALUES AND CORE ATrIDTUDES:

candidate Obama "never set foot

. . .

after the primary season," id., a "nearly identical"

measure "passed easily with nearly 58 percent of the vote." Dan Frosch, Vote Results
Are Mixed On a Ban On Preference, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A19.
352. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26, cl. 1. For a detailed history of the referendum from
the point of view of those supporting it, see CAROL M. ALLEN, ENDING RACIAL
PREFERENCES: THE MICHIGAN STORY (2008).
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undergraduate admissions program invalidated by the Court.353
The University fought the measure tooth and nail. It became an active
member of One Michigan United, a broad, well-funded coalition that
vigorously opposed passage of the proposition.35 4 In an editorial statement,
President Mary Sue Coleman declared that "our state stands on the brink of
telling the world, 'Women and minorities need not apply."' 355 And she
made largely the same case the University had pressed before the Court
three years earlier: "Affirmative action works; it is a targeted, not heavyhanded, tool. Impressive social science research demonstrates the positive
educational outcomes linked with diverse classrooms. Students learn better
in a diverse class. They are more open to different perspectives, and are
better prepared to participate in a global economy."35' 6 Her pleas fell on
deaf ears. The measure was approved by substantial majority of those
of its proponents called a "dramatic victory" in a
voting,357 in what one
'
"very tough state."358
It then survived a series of legal challenges
questioning both the manner in which the measure was placed on the
ballot359 and its constitutionality. 360
Colleges and universities do not function in a vacuum. They exist, and
are valued and valuable, precisely because they serve the needs and
interests of the communities that support them. This is especially true for
public colleges and universities, which depend on public financing. It is
353.

See Peter Schmidt, A Referendum on Race Preferences Divides Michigan,

354.

See Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race PreferencesSplits Michigan, N. Y.

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 27, 2006, at A21 ("Jennifer Gratz is at it again ...trying
to accomplish at the polls what she could not in the courts.").

TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al (noting that One United Michigan had "raised and spent
$3.3 million"). The Law School Admission Council, which oversees the development
and administration of the LSAT, was also an active opponent of the measure. See
Schmidt, supra note 350, at A23 (noting that LSAC donated $250,000 to One United
Michigan).
355. Coleman, supra note 343.
356. Id.
357. See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
529 F. Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that the final margin was 57.9%
for and 43.1% against and that "[o]nly three of Michigan's 83 counties rejected the
measure").
358. Peter Schmidt, Michigan Overwhelmingly Adopts Ban on Affirmative-Action
Preferences, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 17, 2006, at A23 (quoting Ward Connerly).

Connerly is a former regent of the University of California and has been one of the
major forces behind the passage these measures, in particular Proposition 209 in
California. See Lewin, supra note 351, at A20.
359. See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the district court in this action found "widespread fraud" on the part of
individuals securing signatures to place the measure on the ballot). The court
ultimately held that the passage of the measure rendered claims related to this moot.
Id. at 592.
360.

See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 294 (rejecting

the constitutional challenges).
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also a special concern for law schools, whose core mission is to provide
well-trained professionals, able and willing to provide the sorts of legal
services required by their communities. The challenges posed by public
opposition to affirmative action and diversity are accordingly significant.
Both scholars"' and individual members of the Court36 2 have suggested
that race-conscious admissions plans are likely to remain targets of further
litigation. The public interest law firms that pursue such lawsuits have in
turn made it quite clear that they are ready, willing, and able to bring such
actions.3 63 Now is not the time for diversity's champions to rest on their
laurels. New challenges to affirmative action and diversity are inevitable
and will almost certainly be more sophisticated than those mounted in the
past. In particular, guided by the Court, sophisticated plaintiffs are likely to
attack many of the basic assumptions that inform the case for diversity3 "
and, in particular, the extent to which a given affirmative action plan
comports with the true rigors of the Grutter analysis. Michigan was in
certain respects fortunate, as the plaintiffs in Grutter and Gratz conceded
the point that diversity could have positive educational outcomes. The few
attacks on that point made in those cases were 3 too
little and came too
66
late.3 65 Future defendants may not be so fortunate.
361. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 889, 896 (2004) ("Justices Scalia and Thomas ...basically tr[ied] to foment, in
their separate opinions, further litigation.").
362. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("[T]oday's Grutter-Gratzsplit doubleheader seems perversely designed to
prolong the controversy and the litigation.").
363. See, e.g., CIR Press Release, supra note 9 ("Although the court upheld the law
school system, this too, will end up as cold comfort for Michigan and schools with
similar practices. Anything they do will likely be a smokescreen for quotas-and that
just puts us back in litigation."). See also Scott Jaschik, Is Affirmative Action in
Decline or Out of Control?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/l0/09/affirm (discussing the Fall 2008
ballot initiatives and noting CEO's extensive studies challenging various affirmative
action policies).
364. For example, Roger Clegg, the President and General Counsel of the Center
for Equal Opportunity, has stressed that "[1]ike generals, lawyers often err by preparing
to fight the just-past war rather than the next one .......
Roger Clegg, Attacking
"Diversity":A Review of Peter Wood's Diversity: The Invention of a Concept, 31 J. C.

& U. L. 417, 425 (2005). He suggests six arguments that should be made in future
litigation, the first of which is to "[a]ttack the social science evidence that diversity
provides 'educational benefits."' Id.
365. See, e.g., Brief for National Association of Scholars as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 18-21, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241) (citing a single study that showed that the "fostering of group over individual
identity by universities has led to more, not less racial balkanization on our nation's
campuses").
366. Inone such lawsuit working its way through the federal courts, a challenge to
the system now employed by the University of Texas, the plaintiffs to date do not
appear to have read Clegg, see supra note 361, or to have learned from past litigation
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The ability to successfully resist future sallies may well depend on the
extent to which individual institutions live up to the new realities posed by
what Justice O'Connor and her colleagues actually did when they gave
Bakke its teeth. Serious, good-faith programming tailored to the actual
institutional mission is essential.
So is ongoing, comprehensive
assessment. Both of these will provide valuable support in the face of
future litigation. They will also offer a means to persuade an otherwise
skeptical public that racially-defined admissions preferences serve
important social interests. Public support for race-based affirmative action
measures is essential, and institutions should seize the opportunity they
now have to develop and make available information demonstrating that
their assumptions about the benefits of a diverse learning environment are
now supported by compelling educational facts.
As Professor Hurtado has argued, "[w]hile [Grutter and Gratz have]
allowed institutions to better articulate how diversity can ideally work in an
educational setting, it is important for campuses to consider how diversity
initiatives are central to their key mission in practice." 367 Once again,
Professor Hurtado eloquently expressed the challenge when she observes
that "[t]he institutions that take the least transformative approach to
educating diverse students risk criticism and attack when diversity
initiatives are considered 'add ons' or marginal to the institutional
functioning. "368
Our nation's colleges and universities now have the opportunity to show
a true commitment to diversity, not because it offers political or social
cover, but because of the educational benefits it arguably confers. It would
be unfortunate, at best, if institutions with race-conscious admissions
programs-programs that may well be achieving their intended goals-are
challenged to produce evidence to that effect, and are unable to do so
because they have failed to recognize both the opportunities and challenges
offered by Grutter and Gratz. Bakke now has teeth. It is time to recognize
this and act accordingly. That is the best possible defense in future
litigation and the surest route for gaining public trust and support. It is also
mistakes, conceding the question of whether diversity in fact constituted a compelling
constitutional interest. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at
123, Fisher v. Texas, No. A-08-CA-263-SS, (W.D. Tex April 7, 2008) ("To the extent
that UT Austin articulates an interest in promoting 'student body diversity,' Plaintiff
does not challenge this interest."). The policies at issue have, at least for the time
being, been held to be in compliance with the mandates of Grutter and Gratz. See
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. A-08-CA-263-SS (W.D. Tex Aug. 17, 2009)
(order granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants). The organization that
brought the suit, the Project for Fair Representation, has, however, "vowed to appeal as
far as necessary." Scott Jaschik, Court Win for Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC.,
Aug.
19,
2009,
available
at
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/08/18/texas.
367. Hurtado, Linking Diversity, supra note 149, at 189.
368. Id.
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the surest way to discharge higher education's most fundamental
obligation: providing sound educational programs and experiences for the
students it serves.

